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INTRODUCTION
In March 2007, the United States Coast Guard sailors boarded a
suspicious Panamanian vessel that had been spotted by an overhead
surveillance plane. 1 The boarding resulted in the largest maritime cocaine
seizure ever a massive 42,000 pounds uncut. Eleven crewmembers were
arrested, brought to Florida, and indicted.
Yet the seizure did not take place in U.S. territorial waters, or even the
broader U.S. customs zone. It took place in Panamanian waters. 2
Moreover, none of the crew – now facing decades or life in U.S. jails – were
Americans. Finally, there was no evidence that the drugs, seized over a
thousand miles from Miami, were destined to the U.S. Indeed, the DEA
conceded the drugs were bound for a third country.
This case, while exceptional in the amount seized, is otherwise not
unusual. It repeats itself dozens of times each year, as the U.S. begins to
enforce its own drug laws in foreign territory. The wisdom or propriety of
such action as a matter of drug policy, international relations, or even
international law is not the subject of this Article. Rather, the question here
is which of Congress’s enumerated powers authorize it to regulate such
purely foreign conduct?
The international law doctrine of universal jurisdiction (UJ) holds that a
nation can prosecute certain serious international offenses even though it
has no connection to the conduct or participants. 3 It has increasingly been
used by European national courts and international tribunals to prosecute
1

See Garrison Courtney, Drug Enforcement Agency Press Release, DEA, Coast Guard
Make Record Seizure (March 21, 2007), available at
<http://www.dea.gov/pubs/states/newsrel/wdo032107.html>; Remarks by Homeland
Security Secretary Michael Chertoff, U.S. Coast Guard Commandant Admiral Thad Allen
and Drug Enforcement Administration Administrator Karen Tandy at a Press Conference
Announcing the Coast Guard’s Record Maritime Cocaine Seizure (March 21, 2007),
available at http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/pr_1174566428378.shtm.
2
Specifically, 20 miles off the coast of Panama, in the Panamanian “contiguous zone,”
which runs 12-24 miles from the coast. See United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea Art. 33 (giving states some police powers over their contiguous zones).
3
See Beanal v. Freeport-McMoRan, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 362, 371 (E.D. La. 1997)
(“Where a state has universal jurisdiction, it may punish conduct although the state has no
links of territoriality or nationality with the offender or victim.” (quoting RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 404 cmt. a (1987)). See generally, Eugene
Kontorovich, The Piracy Analogy: Modern Universal Jurisdiction’s Hollow Foundation,
45 HARV. INT’L L. REV. 190-91 (2004) (discussing origins and basis for UJ) [hereinafter,
Kontorovich, Piracy Analogy].
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alleged human rights violations around the world. The U.S., however, has
been hostile to universal criminal jurisdiction as an international legal
development. Even the U.S. statute criminalizing genocide, the
paradigmatic modern UJ crime, only applies to crimes that directly involve
the U.S. 4
However, under a little-known statute, America uses universal
jurisdiction far more than any other nation, and perhaps even more than all
other nations combined. For two decades, the United States has been
punishing drug crimes (including possession) committed entirely by
foreigners outside U.S. territory, with no demonstrable connection to the
U.S. Under the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (MDLEA), 5 the U.S.
Coast Guard apprehends vessels with drugs on the high seas, often
thousands of miles from American waters; the crews of these vessels are
prosecuted in U.S. courts for violating U.S. drug law, and are sentenced to
terms in U.S. jails. In none of these cases is there any evidence the drugs
were destined for the U.S. While European UJ prosecutions in war crimes
and genocide cases attract a great deal of attention as they involve major
wars and high government officials, the MDLEA cases have gone almost
unnoticed -- no doubt because the defendants are various low-level
members of the Latin American drug trade.
The MDLEA’s UJ provisions raise fundamental questions about the
source and extent of Congress’s constitutional power to regulate purely
foreign conduct. Courts have said the MDLEA fits under Congress’s power
to “Define and Punish Piracies and Felonies on the High Seas.” 6 Yet this
only raises the question of whether that provision has any limits. Perhaps no
Article I powers of Congress have received less attention than “Piracies and
Felonies.” 7 This Article is the second in a two-part project examining the
limits of Congress’s power under the Define and Punish Clause and related
issues – the first academic work examining the nature and scope of these
powers. 8 That companion Article shows that Clause 10 authorizes UJ over
4

18 U.S.C. § 1091(d) (requiring offense to be committed by U.S. national or in U.S.
territory).
5
46 U.S.C Appendix § 1903(a) (1994); id. at § 1903(c)(1)(A) and (C).
6
U.S. CONST., ART. I § 8, cl. 10.
7
See United States v. Biermann, 678 F. Supp 437, 1445 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (“The courts
of the United States have not had many occasions to interpret this constitutional
provision.”); Curtis A. Bradley, Universal Jurisdiction and U.S. Law, 2001 U. Chi. Legal
F. 323, 337 (2001) “[T]he scope of the Define and Punish Clause is unclear.”) [hereinafter,
Bradley, Universal Jurisdiction]; THE HERITAGE GUIDE TO THE CONSTITUTION 126,
EDWARD MEESE, ET. AL, EDS.(2007) (describing the Clause’s meaning as “not
controversial”).
8
See Eugene Kontorovich, The “Define and Punish” Clause and Universal
Jurisdiction: Recovering the Lost Limits, 103 NORTHWESTERN L. REV. __ (forthcoming,
2009) (MS on file with author) [hereinafter, Kontorovich, Define and Punish].
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– at most – crimes that international law has established as universally
cognizable. This limit applies both to the “Felonies” power and the
“offenses against the law of nations.”
Thus the “Define and Punish” clause does not generally authorize
Congress to regulate foreign conduct with no demonstrable U.S.
connection. 9 Congress cannot punish dog-fighting by Indonesians in Java
because Congress has not been authorized by the Constitution to make such
laws. While some UJ may be permissible, it is only in narrowly defined
circumstances. This Article contends that the most or all of the MDLEA’s
jurisdictional provisions go beyond Congress’s Art. I powers in several
ways.
The point can be seen most clearly by looking at “Piracies and Felonies”
in isolation from the Offenses power. The former consists of two distinct
powers – one over piracies, the other over felonies. The powers are
mentioned separately because they are in practice different. Piracy was at
the time of the Framing, and has been until recently the only UJ crime. UJ
was synonymous with the jurisdiction that applied to pirates. Indeed, UJ
was the only characteristic that fundamentally distinguished piracy from
other high seas “felonies.”
Piracy’s unique status as a UJ offense suggests that its enumeration as a
separate power specifically allows Congress to exercise UJ only over piracy
– but not over other high seas “felonies” or international law offenses. To
allow non-UJ crimes to be punished on a UJ basis would be to erase the
distinction that was made in the Constitution between “Piracies” and
“Felonies.” The same point applies to “Offenses against the law of nations,”
of which piracy was also one. This understanding, while only suggested by
the text, is confirmed by examining the view of those Founders who
expressed a view on the matter, as well as the leading jurists of the early
Republic. It is reflected in Supreme Court decisions, as well as Congress’s
interpretation of its own powers. These lessons have apparently been
forgotten, and the MDLEA cases barely mention the Piracies and Felonies
clause.
In short, the MDLEA can only be a valid exercise of the Felonies power
if the drug offenses are UJ offenses in international law – which they are
not. The Piracies and Felonies power also has other limits: it only applies on
the high seas. Yet as this Article shows, many applications of the MDLEA
extend beyond the high seas, suggesting they are invalid for an additional
reason.
The issue is of significant practical and theoretical importance. From a
9

See id.

23-Mar-08]

Kontorovich

5

criminal law perspective, hundreds if not thousands are in jail under this
statute, which lies at best at the horizon of Congress’s Art. I powers.
Furthermore, exploring the potential Art. I basis for the MDLEA exposes
several important and novel questions of constitutional and international
law in addition to the issue of UJ under Clause 10 explored in the
companion Article. Can the foreign commerce clause be used to regulate
conduct with no U.S. nexus? Can a law be considered an exercise of
Congress’s treaty power if passed a decade before the relevant treaty is
ratified. That is, can a treaty retroactively validate a statute? Do Senate
declarations made when ratifying count as part of the treaty for the purpose
of Congress’s lawmaking powers? Can Congress “define” a crime as an
offense against international law when international law does not seem to
treat it as such? To what extent can Congress assert UJ over acts committed
not just in international waters but in foreign territory? Thus the MDLEA
offers a tour of Art. I’s foreign relations provisions.
Part I explains the history and purposes of the MDLEA, and outlines the
provisions that apply without any nexus to the U.S. Part II explains that the
Felonies power does not authorize UJ over offenses that international law
does not treat as universally cognizable. It goes on to discuss how much
discretion Congress has in “defining” whether an offense is universally
cognizable when international law is unclear on the matter. Part III then
applies this to drug smuggling, and finds no support in international custom
for treating it as a UJ crime. Thus Congress cannot treat it as a “piracy.” It
can only punish it if it has a U.S. nexus. Part III goes on to consider ways in
which international jurisdictional rules might lend support to some aspects
of the MDLEA. It also explains that some applications of the statute will be
unconstitutional for an additional reason: they do not happen on the “high
seas.” On the theory that Congress need not accurately identify the source
of its constitutional power when enacting a statute, Part IV looks to other
potential legislative powers that might provide a constitutional basis for the
MDLEA. The Article concludes that there does not seem to be a clear Art. I
source for much of the MDLEA’s provisions that apply U.S. law in the
absence of a U.S. nexus. Other applications would depend on difficult
interpretations of novel issues that would at least require more careful
analysis and explicit discussion than the cursory treatment courts have thus
far given such cases.

I. BACKGROUND
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A. Expanding Jurisdiction on the High Seas
The increasing flow of drugs from the Southern Hemisphere into the
U.S. – first marijuana in the 70s and then the more profitable cocaine in the
80s – and the increasing sophistication of the smugglers lead Congress to
gradually expand the scope of its extraterritorial law-making. Because of
the difficulty of catching traffickers in the relatively short time they are in
U.S. waters, the U.S. began projecting its enforcement increasingly far from
its shores. Today the Coast Guard patrols the oceans thousands of miles
away – and often just off the coast of other states – as part of U.S. anti-drug
efforts. And to ensure the Coast Guard’s ability to catch those with drugs
bound for the U.S., the Congress cast a net that pulls in – and makes subject
to U.S. law – even those foreign vessels whose cargo is not demonstrably
destined here.
1. Marijuana on the High Seas Act
The MDLEA built on and expanded the jurisdictional provisions of its
predecessor, the Marijuana on the High Seas Act (MHSA), passed in 1980.
Drug importation had significantly increased in the 1970s, and Coast Guard
interdiction efforts became an important part of the War on Drugs.
Smugglers adopted a “mothership” strategy, where a large drug-laden ship
would hover on the high seas, just outside of U.S. customs waters, and bring
the contraband to shore via many small and difficult to detect boats. When
the motherships were seized on the high seas, successful prosecution proved
elusive. The motherships themselves were generally foreign-flagged and
foreign-crewed, and proving a conspiracy to import was apparently
difficult. 10 The House Report on the bill complained that the impunity of
the foreign drug traffickers hurt Coast Guard morale.
The main relevant innovation of the MHSA was to extend U.S.
jurisdiction on the high seas not just to “U.S. vessels,” but also to a new
category, “vessels subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.” This
latter category was defined as stateless vessels, meaning a vessel flying no
flag, or bearing fraudulent or multiple registries. 11 Earlier drafts of the
legislation sought to extend jurisdiction to genuinely foreign vessels
whenever the flag state consents. However, the Committee reported
“various jurisdictional and constitutional” objections to using a state’s
“prior consent as a basis for. . . domestic criminal jurisdiction.” 12 The
10

See H.R. Rep. 96-323 at 5 (July, 10, 1979).
Id. at 24-25.
12
Report of the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries on H.R. 2538, at 7, Rep.
No. 96-323 (July 10, 1979).
11
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constitutional concerns were not made explicit, and the chief worry seemed
to be about international law, which was understood to require a nexus for
prosecution. The statute’s authors seemed to think that as a matter of
international law, flag state consent would still be an inadequate basis given
that drug trafficking “is not generally accepted as an international crime.” 13
However, under the MHSA, a “purported flag state” could reject a vessel’s
claim of nationality. 14 Thus the Marijuana on the High Seas Act did sweep
in cases involving foreigners on the high seas, on non-American vessels,
without proof that the vessel or cargo was destined for America. Moreover,
the alleged flag state’s ability to deny claims of registry at its discretion
could function as an informal version of consent jurisdiction.
2. Adopting the MDLEA
The MHSA proved anachronistic almost as soon as it was adopted. The
cocaine boom of the 1980s lead to a vast increase in drug smuggling, and a
correlate demand for more aggressive action. The 1980 statute, designed for
a marijuana era, now seemed weak. Thus in 1986, Congress expanded the
jurisdictional provisions of its maritime drug laws once again.
The Senate report claimed the MHSA was troublesome to enforce.
Extraterritorial jurisdiction over foreign vessels turned on defects in
registry. However, evidence of a vessel’s nationality took several days to
obtain from the defendant’s home state. It could be hard to prove whether a
vessel was stateless. Obtaining such evidence that would be “sufficient to
withstand evidentiary objections in a U.S. courtroom can take months.” 15
The MDLEA sought to avoid such problems by expanding jurisdiction far
beyond stateless vessels.
First, jurisdiction was extended to any vessel with some U.S.
connection. This includes anyone aboard vessels registered in the U.S,
owned or formerly owned, in whole or part by U.S. nationals or
corporations; 16 or U.S. nationals and resident aliens aboard any vessels; as
well as any vessel in U.S. territorial or customs waters. 17 But the statute
also applies U.S. drug laws (not just importation laws) to vessels that fall
outside this broad description, and even to foreign-crewed vessels in foreign
waters. The MDLEA expanded on the MHSA by extending U.S.
jurisdiction to any foreign vessels on the high seas, or even in foreign
territorial waters, so long as the relevant foreign nation consents. 18
13

Id. at 20.
Committee Report at 23, analysis A.2(b).
15
Sen. Rep. 99-530 at 15 (Oct. 6, 1986).
16
§1803(b)(2)-(3).
17
§ 1903(a).
18
§ 1903(c)(1)(C).
14
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This consent is broadly defined – it may be “oral” – and not subject to
challenge in court: it “may be obtained by radio, telephone, or similar oral
or electronic means.” 19 Moreover, the definition of stateless vessels is
expanded to those that do not produce evidence of their registry when
requested by the Coast Guard 20 – a request which, on the high seas or in
foreign territorial waters, they may feel fully entitled to reject, as well as
those whose registry is not “affirmatively and unequivocally” confirmed by
the foreign state. 21 Given that the Senate report makes clear that obtaining
any kind of registry confirmation from foreign states is slow, difficult, and
confusing, this provision would sweep in many genuinely foreign (not
actually lacking a legitimate registry) vessels.
Because these are classified as “vessels subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States,” no conspiracy to import need be proven; they are treated
exactly as if they were U.S. ships, over which Congress’s power is plenary.
Thus the statute clearly criminalizes mere “possession” on these foreign
vessels in foreign or international waters.22 Moreover, the statute clearly
instructed courts to construe these provisions as broadly as possible. It
explicitly brushes aside any presumptions against extraterritoriality,23 and
bars any jurisdictional or substantive defenses based on the U.S.’s “failure
to comply with international law.” 24 Indeed, a 1996 amendment sought to
keep all questions of statelessness away from a jury by providing that
“jurisdiction of the United States with respect to vessels subject to this
chapter is not an element of any offense… [and] are preliminary questions
of law to be determined solely by the trial judge.” 25 With the cocaine
epidemic raging, the “constitutional objections” that had dissuaded
Congress from adopting a state-consent criterion of jurisdiction for the
MHSA were absent from the discussion of the MDLEA.
Congress did not specify which head of Art. I authority it exercised
when enacting the MDLEA or its predecessor. However, courts and
commentators have consistently seen the law as pursuant to the Piracies and
Felonies Clause because “that clause is the only specific grant of power to
be found in the Constitution for the punishment of offenses outside the
territorial limits of the United States.” 26 A few courts have implied that the
19

Id. at (c)(2)(C).
Id. at (c)(2)(B).
21
Id. at (c)(2)(C).
22
§ 1903(a).
23
§ 1903(h).
24
§ 1903(d).
25
Subsec. (f). Pub. L. 104-324, § 1138(a)(5)
26
United States v. Suerte, 291 F.3d 366, 375 (5th Cir. 2002). See also, United States v.
Davis, 905 F.2d 245, 248 (9th Cir.1990); United States v. Burke, 540 F. Supp. 1282, 1288
(D. P.R. 1982).
20
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act must be an exercise of the felonies power in particular, though most
have mistakenly spoke of “Piracies and Felonies” as if they are synonymous
or interchangeable.27 Since this clause speaks directly to criminal legislation
for the high seas, it seems to be the natural place to seek authority for the
MDLEA.
B. Enforcement
Under standard rules of international law, the Coast Guard cannot stop
or board foreign vessels on the high seas or in foreign waters. Thus the
United States has negotiated “bilateral maritime agreements” with 26
Caribbean and Latin American states since the enactment of the MDLEA. 28
The agreements have been negotiated country by country over the past 20
years. They set out frameworks for the U.S. to stop, search, and sometimes
board the other state’s vessels if they are suspected of drug trafficking. 29
The agreements coordinate numerous technical and tactical aspects of joint
counter-narcotics enforcement, including the “ship rider” program, where a
law enforcement officer from one country embarks on the other’s vessels,
with the authority to board and make arrests in the name of his home
state. 30 The agreements generally follow a standard six-part form apparently
drafted by U.S. officials. However, the particular arrangement with each
country often varies somewhat from the basic template, depending on
particular local concern. 31
The agreements primarily provide a framework for the U.S. to interdict
27

See, e.g., United States v. Moreno-Morillo, 334 F.3d 819, 824-25 (9th Cir. 2003)
(holding that drug smuggling in international waters is a “piracy or felony within the
meaning of Article I, Section 8, Clause 10” without specifying whether it is justified by the
power over “piracies” or over “felonies”); United States v. Martinez-Hidalgo, 993 F.2d
1052, 1056 (3rd Cir. 1993) (noting that MDLEA justified by Congress’s authority under
“Piracies and Felonies” clause without specifying whether drug smuggling is piracy or
felony).
28
See United States Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (March 2007),
available at <http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2007/vol1/html/80853.htm>. Only a few
nations in the area, such as Ecuador and Cuba, have not signed such an agreement.
29
See, e.g. United States v. Perlaza, 439 F.3d 1149, 1168 (9th Cir. 2006) (seizure with
Columbian consent pursuant to bilateral agreement). See also, Marian Nash Leich, U.S. U.K. Agreement on Vessels Trafficking in Drugs, 76 AM. J. INT’L L. 377 (1982) .
30
Agreement Concerning Cooperation for the Suppression of Illicit Maritime
Traffic in Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, with Implementing
Agreement (United States-Honduras), Art IV. State Dept. No. 02-4 (March 29, 2000).
31
See Statement of Rear Admiral Ernest R. Riutta Before the Subcommittee on
Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources Committee on Government Reform
U.
S.
House
Of
Representatives
(May
13,
1999),
available
at
<http://testimony.ost.dot.gov/test/pasttest/99test/Riutta2.htm>.
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and potentially seize foreign vessels, in coordination and with the approval
of the flag state. They do not address prosecution of the crew in any detail.
However, the typical agreement contains a clause that, while reserving
primary jurisdiction over the vessel and crew to the flag state, notes it could
waive it in favor of the U.S. 32 Presumably the flag nation could authorize
U.S. prosecution in the absence of an agreement saying that they might do
so. If these clauses have any meaning, it is to make clear that no automatic
or ex ante authorization to prosecute should be inferred from the boarding
and seizure provisions of the agreements, which in many ways give the
Coast Guard considerable authority over the other nation’s vessels. Some of
the agreements make this point explicitly. 33
The MDLEA has quietly become the largest font of universal
jurisdiction in U.S. courts, dwarfing the more high-profile Alien Tort
Statute litigation. Indeed, the MDLEA appears to be the only statute under
which the U.S. asserts universal criminal jurisdiction. The practical
consequences are significant. Prosecutions under the MDLEA often involve
a vessel’s entire crew. 34 Given the large quantities of drugs on these vessels,
these foreigners, captured on foreign vessels in international waters, can
face decades in federal prison. And this despite potentially never having set
foot in, or directed their activities towards, the U.S. The exact number of UJ
prosecutions under the MDLEA is unclear, because the statute covers both
U.S. vessels and nationals and foreign vessels and nationals, and applies in
U.S. waters as well as the high seas. Separate statistics are not kept on how
32

See id., Art. VII(1):
In all cases arising in the territorial sea or internal waters of the Republic of
Honduras, or concerning Honduran flag vessels seaward of any State's territorial
sea, the State of Honduras shall have the primary right to exercise jurisdiction
over a detained vessel, cargo and/or persons on board (including seizure,
forfeiture, arrest, and prosecution), provided, however, that the State of Honduras
may . . . waive its primary right to exercise jurisdiction and authorize the
enforcement of United States law against the vessel, cargo and/or persons on
board.
33
See, e.g., Agreement Between the Government of Jamaica and the Government of
the United States of America Concerning Cooperation in Suppressing Illicit Maritime Drug
Trafficking Art. 3(5) (1997) (“Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed as a waiver by
a Party of its right to exercise jurisdiction over its nationals.”), available at
<http://www.caricom.org/jsp/secretariat/legal_instruments/agreement_jamaica_us_drugtraf
fic.jsp?menu=secretariat>; Agreement Between the Government of the United States of
America and the Government of Barbados Concerning Cooperation in Suppressing Illicit
Maritime Drug Trafficking Art. 15(2) (1997) (“Nothing [in the agreement] shall be
construed as authority for one Party to enforce its laws against nationals of the other
Party.”).
34
United States v. Humphries-Brant, 190 Fed. Appx. 837, 839-40 (11th Cir. 2006)
(affirming denial of minor-participant sentence reduction to the 135 month sentence of
simple crew member).
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many MDLEA prosecutions involve situations where there is no nexus with
the U.S. A conservative guess would be 100 or more individuals a year. In
one recent year, 199 people were arrested in Columbian vessels or waters
alone. 35 District court cases in the Westlaw databases show roughly 20
decisions annually in recent years, though each case usually involves
multiple defendants. Of course, there are many more UJ prosecutions, since
the defendants, like in other criminal cases, almost invariably plead guilty
and waive appeals.
C. MDLEA in the Courts
The MDLEA has been subject to a wide variety of legal challenges –
not surprisingly given the serious penalties under it. These have been almost
invariably, and firmly, rebuffed by the courts. 36 However, no published
opinion deals squarely with the question of Congress’s Art I. power over
purely foreign “Felonies.”
1. Due Process issues
Constitutional challenges to the MDLEA have focused on Due Process
grounds. 37 Defendants argue that the Fifth Amendment requires that
defendants have some “nexus” or factual connection with the forum. If
correct, this would rule out UJ. But the argument is framed in terms of
individual rights rather than of the Article I limits on Congress. 38 Most
courts of appeals (including the 11th Circuit, which gets most MDLEA
cases) 39 have held that the Fifth Amendment requires no nexus. The Ninth
Circuit, on the other hand, holds that due process requires that the
defendant’s conduct have some nexus with U.S. 40
Due process is a personal right and thus can be waived – this points up
an important difference in whether a nexus requirement is located in the
35

Statement of Adm. Ralph D. Utley Before the 109th Congress United States House
of Representatives Committee on International Relations (May 11, 2005), available at
<http://www.internationalrelations.house.gov/archives/109/utl051105.pdf>. Not all of these
arrests necessarily lead to prosecution.
36
The statute itself takes the U.S.’s “failure to comply with international law” off the
table as a defense. See § 1903(d).
37
See, e.g., United States v. Tinoco, 304 F.3d 1088, 1109 (11th Cir. 2002) (holding that
provisions of MDLEA requiring Court to decide whether statutory jurisdictional
requirements have been met does not violate Apprendi, Due Process Clause or jury trial
right).
38
See Tinoco, at 1110 n. 21 (noting that case does not bear on Congress’s “substantive
authority under Article I”).
39
See, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez, 76 F.3d 931, 938, 940-41 (11th Cir. 1985).
40
Perlaza, 439 F.3d at 1161.
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Fifth Amendment, or in Art. I limits on Congress’s legislative power. Most
courts of appeals hold that whatever right the defendant has to not be
subject to UJ is really an international law right of his state. In other words,
it is not that the defendant has a right to be free of UJ, but rather that his
state has the sovereign power to deal with his crime. In this view, even if
there was a nexus requirement from the Due Process clause, the consent of
the defendant’s home state to prosecution waives this defense. 41 And such
consent is routinely given in MDLEA cases, 42 making the Fifth
Amendment nexus defense a non-starter except in the Ninth Circuit.
2. Article I issues
The question of whether the MDLEA exceeds Congress’s Art. I limits
has not been fully resolved by any court. 43 However, in the past few years
some defendants have begun to point to a pair of early 19th-century
Supreme Court cases involving piracy and murder on the high seas
indicating limits on UJ under the Felonies power. 44 These arguments have
usually been raised in a cursory manner for the first time on appeal or
otherwise waived, and thus faced an uphill battle under a plain error
standard. The 11th Circuit has denied such appeals with almost no
discussion, noting that other courts had found the MDLEA to be an exercise
of the Piracies and Felonies power, though those cases simply cited the
clause, and did not discuss the issue of its limits, 45 or that since the old
41

See United States v. Cardales, 168 F.3d 548, 553 (1st Cir 1999); United States v.
Martinez-Hidalgo, 993 F.2d 1052, 1056 (3d Cir 1993). But see, United States v.
Klimavicius-Viloria, 144 F.3d 1249, 1255-57 (9th Cir. 1998) (requiring for Fifth
Amendment purposes evidence that drugs were bound for the U.S., even when home
country consented to prosecution).
42
United States v. Rodriquez-Duran, 507 U.S. F.3d, 749, 757 n.9 (1st. Cir. 2007)
(describing the processes for obtaining foreign state consent, which usually takes about 10
hours).
43
Madera-Lopez, 190 Fed. Appx. at 835 (“There is no precedent from either the
Supreme Court or this Court resolving the issue of whether the MDLEA’s enactment
exceeded Congress’s authority under the “Piracies and Felonies Clause.”).
44
The author of this article was responsible for drafting the first of these defense
motions. See Unites States v. Garcia, 182 Fed. Appx. 873 (11th Cir. 2006). Though
unsuccessful below and on appeal, the argument was quickly echoed by many other
defendants. The view of the clause’s limits taken here and in Define and Punish Clause is
the product of much more extensive research, and is in some ways different from those
positions advanced in litigation.
45
Compare United States v. Garcia, 182 Fed. Appx. 873, 876 (11th Cir. 2006) (“While
there is little case law interpreting the scope of the High Seas Clause, other circuits have
upheld the constitutionality of the MDLEA . . .[w]ithout specifically discussing the High
Seas Clause’s limits.”) (citations omitted); with Madera-Lopez, 190 Fed. Appx. at 836 n.1
(recognizing that cases cited in Garcia “did not discuss the limits of Congress’s authority
under the Piracies and Felonies Clause”).
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Supreme Court cases do not deal squarely with the statute at hand, they are
not binding.
To the extent courts have considered such arguments, they misread
Palmer and Furlong as purely statutory cases about the scope of 1790
Crimes Act, 46 or based on international rather than constitutional law
principles. 47 Furthermore, litigants only began to mention the Piracies and
Felonies clause after most courts had ruled that the Fifth Amendment does
not require a nexus in MDLEA cases. Thus courts see the Felonies
argument as simply a repleading of the oft-rejected nexus argument, and
treat it is as a matter of stare decisis. 48 This conflates two totally different
inquiries – the Fifth Amendment and the Define and Punish clause. One
provision can do what the other does not. 49 The fact that the Fifth
Amendment does require a nexus says nothing about whether Congress has
the power to legislate absent a nexus. Indeed, this kind of logic succumbs to
what the Framers saw as the greatest danger in having a Bill of Rights:
people might conclude that if something is not prohibited by the first eight
amendments, it is permitted – without examining whether Congress’s
enumerated powers include such an act.
As the next Part will show, there is good reason to believe that much of
the MDLEA’s UJ application exceeds Congress’s Art. I limits. This was
indeed recognized by the Marshall Court in Palmer and Furlong, as a close
reading of those cases suggests. It is also corroborated by a wide range of
other evidence not yet considered by any court an MDLEA case: strong
statements made by Justices James Wilson and Joseph Story in their grand
jury instructions, John Marshall’s famous House of Representatives speech
Even less persuasively, Suerte took the astonishing step of refusing to follow Furlong
based on a notion that it “may be at loggerheads, however, with more recent
pronouncements by the Court.” Of the two “pronouncements” relied on by Suerte, one is a
dissent, and the other a dictum that does not deal with the Define and Punish Clause at all.
46
United States v. Madera-Lopez, 190 Fed. Appx. 832, 836 (11th Cir. 2006) (holding
that because Furlong did not specifically “hold that Congress exceeded its authority under
the Pirates and Felonies Clause by seeking to regulate drug trafficking on the high seas,” on
plain error review of objection not raised below, district court did not err by finding
MDLEA unconstitutional).
47
See United States v. Suerte, 291 F.3d 366 (5th Cir. 2002).
48
United States v. Estupinan, 453 F.3d 1336, 1338 (11th Cir. 2006) (holding that
district court did not err in failing to strike down MDLEA sua sponte as exceeding
Congress’s Define and Punish power because the circuit has not previously “adorned the
MDLEA with a nexus requirement); United States v. Garcia, 182 Fed. Appx. 873, 876
(11th Cir. 2006) (“We have previously rejected the argument that the MDLEA is
unconstitutional because the conduct at issue lacks a nexus to the United States.”) (citing
Fifth Amendment cases).
49
See Suerte, 291 F.3d at 374-75 (“The opinions addressing the reach of the 1790 Act
are of significance to our consideration of the MDLEA’s reach [under the Fifth
Amendment]”).
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in the Thomas Nash affair, and the views of Congress in not extending UJ
to the slave trade. Nor have courts considered the lessons that might be
learned from the drafting history and purposes of the clause.
Indeed, judicial discussions of the Piracy and Felonies power treat these
“parallel provisions within the same constitutional clause” as having the
same scope. 50 This renders “piracy” entirely redundant: all piracies are
felonies. As the next Part will show, “piracy” was different from all other
felonies in one crucial way: it was universally cognizable. The separate
enumeration of piracy suggests that its unique jurisdictional trait applies
only to it, and not to other felonies on the high seas.
II. “PIRACIES AND FELONIES” AND THE LIMITS ON UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION
Congress has only those powers given to it. The question raised by the
MDLEA is whether the Define and Punish Clause, and in particular its
provision for “Piracies and Felonies on the High Seas,” is an open-ended
empowerment for Congress to punish any crimes on the high seas and any
offenses against the law of nations regardless of whether they have a
connection with the United States. In the companion article, The “Define and
Punish” Clause and Universal Jurisdiction: Recovering the Lost Limits, it is
shown that while “piracies” can be punished without regard to nexus, “Felonies”
and “Offenses” require a direct connection to the U.S. 51 Thus while assaults on
ambassadors were paradigmatic violations of the law of nations, an attack on the

Fijian ambassador to Vanuatu by a citizen of the latter would not fall within
Congress’s power over “offenses.” Similarly, while rape is a felony, when
committed among Vanuatuans on one of their national vessels, it would not
fall within Congress’s “Felonies” power.
The companion Article shows the limits of Clause 10 through a
comprehensive examination of the clause’s origins, text, ratification, and
purposes. It goes on to confirm this understanding of the clause against the
views taken by the courts, the executive branch, and Congress during the
Founding and early Republic – the last time the jurisdictional scope of the
clause was an issue. Naturally, the full analysis cannot be repeated here.
Rather, this Part summarizes the main lines of evidence for treating the
grant of power over “Piracies” as jurisdictionally broader, but substantively
narrower, than the power over felonies and offenses. 52 Even if this
50

See Suerte, 291 F.3d at 374 (observing in MDLEA case that since piracy can be
punished with no U.S. nexus, this “should apply with equal weight to felonies such as at
issue here”).
51
See generally, Kontorovich, Define and Punish, supra n.8.
52
The companion Article explores these sources in greater detail, as well as
considering potential objections, methodological questions, and the few pieces of
inconsistent evidence. See id.
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understanding does not persuade as an original matter, its adoption by these
figures in a series of cases should, as a practical matter, make it hard for a
court today to come to its own conclusions about the meaning of such an
obscure and poorly-documented provision.
A final point bears stressing. The argument here is not that Congress
cannot violate international law, because it is directly binding on Congress.
Such a view has long been rejected. Rather, it is that Clause 10, by using
various terms of art from customary international law, requires one to turn
to that body of law to define those terms. Thus international law is partially
incorporated, but only by explicit reference.

A. The Drafting of the Clause and the legal background
The Define and Punish Clause received little “serious” discussion at the
Philadelphia Convention or during ratification. 53 Yet on its face, the clause
requires further analysis, as it contains a striking double redundancy. Piracy
is a subspecies of felony on the high seas. 54 Moreover, piracy is an offense
against the law of nations. 55 Constitutional construction disfavors readings
that render certain provisions superfluous. 56 Indeed, Justice Story insisted
that other potentially overlapping words in Clause 10 should bear separate
meanings. 57 A double-redundancy begs the question whether anything
distinguishes piracy both from other felonies and from other law of nations
crimes. Such a difference would likely be the reason for the Constitution
mentioning piracy separately.
Indeed, one major difference existed between piracy and the other
powers listed in Clause 10. Piracy was the only universal jurisdiction
offense know to the Framers, indeed the only one until recent decades. 58
53

JOSEPH STORY, III COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 1160 (1833) (hereafter “STORY, COMMENTARIES”).
54
See WILLIAM RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 10708 (2d ed. 1829) (“Felony. . . when committed on the high seas, amounts to piracy.”).
55
See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, IV COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 68, 71
(observing that piracy is both a felony under English law and an offense against the law of
nations) (1769); FEDERALIST NO. 42 (Madison).
56
See, e.g., Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 392 (1821) (Marshall, C.J) (arguing
against a suggested interpretation of Constitution that would render another provision
“mere surplusage”).
57
United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 158 (1820) (Story, J.).
58
See Marshall in Robbins Case (emphasis added) (noting that “piracy under the law
of nations which alone is punishable by all nations”); Smith, 18 U.S. at 162 (1820) (noting
the “general practice of all nations in punishing all persons, whether natives or foreigners,
who have committed this offence against any persons whatsoever”); Talbot v. Jansen, 3
U.S. (Dall.) 133, 165-66 (1795) (“All piracies and trespasses committed against the general
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The definition of piracy in international law was narrow, specific, and
undisputed: robbery on the high seas. Piracy and its notorious UJ status
(referred to at the time as hostis humani generis, enemy of all mankind),
were congruent, almost synonymous.
However, in addition to piracy under the law of nations, each nation
could make diverse offenses “municipal” or “statutory piracies.” Such
statutory piracy could only be punished within the particular state’s
municipal jurisdiction. 59 As Wheaton, the American diplomat, reporter of
Supreme Court decisions, and author of the leading early 19th century
American treatise on international law, put it: “piracy created by municipal
statute could only be punished by that State within whose territorial
jurisdiction” or “on board whose vessels the offence thus created was
committed.” 60 The distinction between “municipal” and “international” or
true piracy obviously tracks the constitutional distinction between felonies
and piracies. It suggests that Congress can “punish” piracy consistent with
its UJ status, but that should not spill over to “felonies.”
B. Early interpretations
With one exception, Congress did not use the Piracies and Felonies
clause to legislate universally over anything but piracy itself until the
MDLEA. The First Congress exercised the “Piracies and Felonies” power
when it enacted the first criminal statute in 1790. It purported to criminalize
“murder or robbery” when committed by “any person” on the high seas. 61
law of nations, are enquirable, and maybe proceeded against, in any nation.”). See
generally Kontorovich, Piracy Analogy, supra n.3, at 190-91.
59
HENRY WHEATON, ENQUIRY INTO VALIDITY OF THE BRITISH CLAIM TO A RIGHT OF
VISITATION AND SEARCH OF AMERICAN VESSELS SUSPECTED TO BE ENGAGED IN THE
ATLANTIC SLAVE TRADE 16 (Philadelphia 1842) (hereinafter WHEATON, RIGHT OF VISIT)
(“All that is meant is, that the offence is visited with the pains and penalties of piracy.”).
60
Id.
61
Section 8 of the statute provided that:
if any person or persons shall commit upon the high seas, or in any river,
haven, basin, or bay, out of the jurisdiction of any particular state, murder or
robbery, or any other offence which if committed within the body of a county,
would by the laws of the United States be punishable with death; or if any captain
or mariner of any ship or other vessel, shall piratically and feloniously run away
with such ship or vessel, or any goods or merchandise to the value of fifty dollars,
or yield up such ship or vessel voluntarily to any pirate; or if any seaman shall lay
violent hands upon his commander, thereby to hinder and prevent his fighting in
defence of his ship or goods committed to his trust, or shall make a revolt in the
ship; every such offender shall be deemed, taken, and adjudged to be a pirate and
felon, and being thereof convicted shall suffer death: and the trial of crimes
committed on the high seas, or in any place out of the jurisdiction of any particular
state, shall be in the district where the offender is apprehended, or into which he
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Subsequent sections went on to say “any person” shall be punished for a
variety of maritime misdeeds, such as “running away with a vessel,” revolt,
assaulting commanders, and attempts and conspiracies to do those things.
Robbery on the high seas was, of course, the international law crime of
piracy, or “general” piracy. But the other offenses that the statute dubbed
“piracy” and made punishable when committed by “any person,” without
restriction. A literal reading would extend U.S. legislative power
universally to a wide variety of major and minor crimes aboard any vessel
on the high seas, and even to some ancillary offenses on land.
The constitutionality of punishing “all persons” for anything other than
international piracy was immediately called into doubt by Justice James
Wilson, a member of the constitutional convention and subsequent state
ratification process, as well as a justice on the first Supreme Court. 62
Instructing a grand jury, Wilson noted the well-known distinction between
general piracy and other maritime crimes that a nation may penalize. This
distinction exists regardless of whether the latter are dubbed “piracies” by
statute. If Congress intended the murder provision to apply to foreigners on
foreign vessels, it would be unconstitutional. 63
Similarly, John Marshall, while a congressman from Virginia, attacked
the constitutionality of a statue during his famous speech on the House floor
in the affair of Jonathan Robbins. First, he argued that the idea that
Congress’s power to punish felonies on the high seas was unlimited lead to
consequences too absurd to accept. Could the U.S. punish desertion by
British seamen from a British to a French vessel, or pick-pocketing among
British sailors? Such a general jurisdiction over high seas offenses had
never been suggested, and certainly could never have been intended by the
drafters or ratifiers. If the text does not expressly forbid it, Marshall argued,
it is only because it was too silly for the Framers to have thought of.
Moreover, even if Congress for some reason wanted to legislate for
purely foreign causes, it could not: “Any general expression in a legislative
act must, necessarily, be restrained to objects within the jurisdiction of the
legislature passing the act.” 64 Thus if the Crimes Act attempted to attach UJ
to anything but piracy, it would go too far, regardless of any findings or
statements by the legislature.
[T]hat [Define and Punish] clause can never be construed to make to
the government a grant of power, which the people making it do not
may first be brought. (emphasis added).
62
See James Wilson, Charge to the Grand Jury of the Circuit Court for the District of
Virginia, in May 1791, in WORKS OF THE HON. JAMES WILSON, 354 (Philadelphia 1804).
63
Id. at 377 (observing the universal application of the murder provisions “could not
be carried out by the courts”).
64
Id. at 863.
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themselves possess. It has already been shown that the people of the
United States have no jurisdiction over offences committed on board a
foreign ship against a foreign nation. Of consequence, in framing a
government for themselves, they cannot have passed this jurisdiction to
that government. The law [the Crimes Act], therefore, cannot act upon
the case. But this clause of the constitution cannot be considered, and
need not be considered, as affecting acts which are piracy under the law
of nations. 65

Thus both Marshall and Wilson doubted that Congress could
constitutionally extended UJ to anything but piracy, which was the only
offense universally cognizable under the law of nations.
C. Supreme Court Precedents
The Supreme Court did not confront the question until nearly two
decades later, in United States v. Palmer. 66 The case was a classic
international law piracy – the armed robbery of a Spanish vessel by a
foreign defendant. The Court held that while Congress could
constitutionally extend UJ to genuine “piracies,” the 1790 Act had not done
so. This conclusion was surprising given the statute’s capacious language of
“any person” – the same language used in the MDLEA. 67 Moreover, it went
against what was generally perceived as Congress’s goal in passing to
statute – to punish piracy to the same extent all other nations do, namely,
universally. (Indeed, Congress promptly passed a new statute to provide
clear authorization for piracy UJ.) Marshall’s reasoning followed the exact
same lines he had laid down twenty years earlier in Robbins’ case. The
statute must be interpreted non-literally even in the case of piracy, because
if “any person” were read literally, it would be quite problematic to apply to
all the non-piratical offenses listed in the statute. Marshall’s clear flouting
of Congressional intent was clearly a narrowing construction to save the
statute from constitutional difficulty.
Because of the narrowing construction, Marshall did not have to directly
express the constitutional issue. But the arguments for reading the statute
narrowly in Palmer were the same ones he used the House to explain why a
broad reading would be unconstitutional. Moreover, both the U.S. Attorney,
arguing for a broad scope for the law, conceded it could not constitutionally
apply universally to non-piratical offenses, and Justice Johnson wrote
separately to stress what was just below the surface in Marshall’s opinion. 68
65

United States v. Robins, 27 F. Cas. 825, 832-33, No. 16,175 (D.C. S.C. 1799).
16 (3 Wheat.) U.S. 610 (1818).
67
46 App. U.S.C. § 1903(a)
68
Palmer, 16 U.S. at 641-42 (“Congress can inflict punishment on offences committed
66
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Two years later a unanimous Court reaffirmed that Congress could not
punish the murder of a foreigner by a foreigner on a foreign vessel. 69 Such a
case was one in which Congress “ha[s] no right to interfere.” 70 This Court
makes clear that that this limitation is not one found in international law, or
due process, or the statute itself. Rather, it is found in the difference
between “Piracy” and “Felony” in Clause 10. As the Court put it, UJ in such
a case would go beyond the “the punishing powers of the body that
enacted” the law. 71 The Court went on to distinguish between piracies at
international law, and other crimes. Murder, when it involves only
foreigners abroad, is a matter in which Congress “has no right to interfere;”
on the other hand, piracy under identical circumstances falls within the
“acknowledged reach of the punishing powers of Congress.”
The Court’s distinction between piracy and murder precisely tracks the
“Piracies and Felonies” distinction:
There exist well-known distinctions between the crimes of piracy and
murder, both as to constituents and incidents. Robbery on the seas is
considered as an offence within the criminal jurisdiction of all nations. .
. . Not so with the crime of murder. It is an offence too abhorrent to the
feelings of man, to have made it necessary that it also should have been
brought within this universal jurisdiction. And hence, punishing it when
committed within the jurisdiction, or, (what is the same thing,) in the
vessel of another nation, has not been acknowledged as a right. 72

The “constituents” of the crimes are their elements – the substantive
conduct. The “incidents” are the rules regarding their punishment. Furlong
makes two points: Congress does not have power to “define” the
“constituents” of offenses without regard to the international law definition.
And, more pertinently for present purposes, it cannot apply the “incidents”
of piracy to something that does not have that status. Of course, the only
“incident” of piracy that it did not share with murder was its UJ status.
The test of what Congress can make universally cognizable is the law of
nations; Congress cannot expand its jurisdiction by calling crimes “piracies”
when they do not have such a status in international law. Piracy and murder
“are things so essentially different in their nature, that not even the

on board the vessels of the United States, or by citizens of the United States, any where;
but Congress cannot make that piracy which is not piracy by the law of nations, in order to
give jurisdiction to its own courts over such offences.”) (emphasis added).
69
See United States v. Furlong, 618 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 184 (1820).
70
Id. at 198.
71
Id. at 196 (emphasis added).
72
Id. at 198.
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omnipotence of legislative power can confound or identify them.” 73 It would
be harder to find clearer language expressing the view that this limit is
inherent and nonderogable. 74
D. Congressional self-limitation.
In the early 1800s, the U.S. and Europe began taking measures to ban
the transatlantic slave trade. A growing number of nations banned the trade
and a series of international congresses decried it as an abomination. In
1820 Congress went further than any other nation had ever gone before by
declaring the slave trade a form of “piracy” punishable by death. 75 The
statute applied to “any citizen of the United States, being of the crew or
ship’s company of any foreign ship or vessel engaged in the slave trade, or
any person whatever, being of the crew or ship’s company of any ship or
vessel, owned in the whole or part, or navigated for, or in behalf of, any
citizen or citizens of the United States.” In other words, Congress extended
jurisdiction just short of UJ, but no further. While the Act cast the
jurisdictional net broadly, and dubbed the trade piratical, Congress chose to
only punish the conduct to the extent it had a demonstrable U.S. nexus. 76
The legislative history makes clear that Congress would have liked to
punish the trade without any regard to U.S. nexus. Congress wanted to
eliminate the trade itself, not just U.S. involvement, which had already been
criminalized by earlier laws. But slave trading was at the time clearly not a
violation of international law and not recognized as universally
cognizable. 77
73

Id. at 199.
See See A. Mark Weisburd, Due Process Limits On Federal Extraterritorial
Legislation?, 35 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 379, 420 (1997).
75
Statutes at Large, 16th Congress, Sess. I, Ch. 113, 1820, An Act to continue in force
an act to protect the commerce of the United States, and punish the crime of piracy,” and
also to make further provisions for punishing the crime of piracy, §§ 4-5.
76
Many of the cases brought under the Act revolved around whether either the
citizenship or ownership requirements were satisfied. See, e.g., United States v. Gordon, 25
F.Cas. 1364, (Cir. Ct. N.Y. 1861). Before passports, when much of the U.S. population
were first or second generation immigrants, determining a defendant’s nationality was not
easy, especially if he wished to obscure it. Similarly, slave traders resorted to a variety of
measures, like fictitious sales and renaming to throw off their American connection. As an
element of the offense, the jurisdictional requirements had to be proven by the U.S., and
thus defendants relied heavily on this point.
77
The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66 (1825); III JOURNAL OF THE EXECUTIVE
PROCEEDINGS OF THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 381 (1824) (reporting
resolution questing President to negotiate with other nations to establish slave trade as
jurisdictionally equivalent to piracy); HENRY WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW, § 124, 200-201 (1836).
74
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The report on the bill from the House Committee on the Slave Trade
makes clear that Congress limited the reach of the Act because of concerns
about the limits of its Piracies and Felonies powers. 78 In explaining why the
law only punished offenses with an American connection, the House report
explained that “the Constitutional power of the Government has already
been exercised . . . in defining the crime of piracy” as far is it can go given
that the slave trade had yet to become universally cognizable:
Such is the unavoidable consequence of any exercise of the authority of
Congress, to define and punish this crime. The definition and punishment
can bind the United States alone. 79

Thus in the act of 1820, the U.S. acted “only in relation to themselves,”
understanding that “they were bound to execute it, by the injunction of their
constitution to execute it, so far as respects the punishment of their own
citizens.” 80 Congress’s view of its power over non-UJ “Felonies” as
jurisdictionally limited strongly corroborates the understanding suggested
by the separate mention of piracies and felonies, and views expressed by the
Framers, influential interpreters such as Marshall and Story, and in Supreme
Court dicta. Indeed, as statement against interest – limiting its own power –
Congress’s inaction in 1820 may carry additional interpretive weight.
III. THE MDLEA EXCEEDS CLAUSE 10’S LIMITS
Congress cannot attach the jurisdictional consequences of “piracies” to
“felonies.” This raises the question of whether drug trafficking is a piracy or
felony.” It takes little effort to show that it does not fit within the traditional
definition of piracy as “robbery on the high seas,” 81 or even the more
modern definition of “acts of violence or detention, or any act of
depredation, committed for private ends” aboard a vessel. 82
However, the Define and Punish clause’s limitation of UJ to piracy can
be understood in one of two ways. The more textual or originalist
understanding would be that only piracy is the only offense which Congress
can punish without a U.S. nexus. A broader view would reason that since
piracy was the only UJ offense at the time of the Founding, the Clause
means to allow Congress to use UJ over whatever offenses are universally
78

See ANNALS OF CONGRESS, 16th Cong. 1st sess., 2209 (May 10?, 1820).
See ANNALS OF CONGRESS, 16th Cong. 1st sess., 2209 (May 10?, 1820).
80
See WHEATON, RIGHT OF VISITATION, supra n. 59, at 109-10 (emphasis added).
81
See United States v. Smith.
82
UNCLOS Art. 101(a). The violence or depredation must be “directed… against”
people on the ship or on another ship on the high seas. Operating a pirate vessel or
facilitating or encouraging piratical acts also counts as piracy. Id. at 101(b)-(c).
79

22

Art. I Horizon

[23-Mar-08

cognizable under the CIL of the time. Thus as new offenses become
universally cognizable, the scope of “piracies” changes and expands. No
position is taken here on the permissibility of “updating” to track evolving
international law.
If the Constitutional text locks into the 1789 limits on UJ, the MDLEA
obviously exceeds this limit. If “updating” is allowed, the analysis is
somewhat more complex. Thus for the sake of argument, this section
assumes “piracies” encompasses today’s UJ offenses, and the Clause 10 as
a whole tracks changes in international law. Nonetheless, this Part shows
even with “updating,” the MDLEA exceeds the Define and Punish Clause’s
limits in two distinct ways: it treats “Felonies” as “Piracies,” and punishes
them even beyond the “high seas.”

A. Congressional discretion to “Define”
Some might view the grant to Congress of a power to “define… piracies
and … offenses” as giving it the final say on what is a non-UJ felony and
what is not. Thus before considering whether modern CIL provides some
basis for the MDLE, this section shows that Congress does not get the first
and last word on the content of CIL.
The “Define and Punish” clause raises questions about how much
flexibility Congress has in “defining.” 83 Can courts look to the law of
nations to determine whether Congress has defined a crime that is actually
recognized by international law, or is whether something violates the law of
nations itself a question left entirely to Congress through its power to
“define”? The word “define” may suggest some latitude for Congress, that
83

Zephyr Rain Teachout, Note, Defining and Punishing Abroad: Constitutional Limits
on the Extraterritorial Reach of the Offenses Clause, 48 DUKE L.J. 1305, 1305 (1999). The
few academic discussions arrive at markedly different answers. Beth Stephens, Federalism
and Foreign Affairs: Congress’s Power to “Define and Punish… Offenses Against the Law
of Nations,” 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 447, 545 (2000) (“[I]n deciding what falls within the
reach of the Clause, Congress’s decisions are entitled to significant deference from the
judiciary.”); and, Note, The Offenses Clause After Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 118 HARV. L.
REV. 2378 (2005) (arguing that the “fluid, self-reinforcing character of modern customary
international law and the role Congress has in shaping international law” requires that in a
post-Erie world, Congress not be confined to defining offenses clearly or certainly
established as violations of international law); with, Charles D. Siegal, Deference and Its
Dangers: Congress’ Power To “Define . . . Offenses Against the Law of Nations”, 21
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 865, 879 (1988) (“It would . . . extend the clause too far to
permit Congress to use it to define offenses without a clear international law basis.”), and
Teachout, 1321 (arguing that purpose of provision was “to enable Congress to clarify
unclear international law” rather than to “grant Congress the power to create its own
version of international law.”).
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it is not entirely bound by some external, objectively-determinable body of
international law.
The history of the provision suggests conflicting answers, and the courts
have had few occasions to address the question. The clause, as it first
appeared coming out of the Committee on Detail, gave Congress the power
“to declare the law and punishment of piracies and felonies & c.” 84
Ultimately “define” was substituted for “declare the law of,” though with
little apparent change in meaning. 85 The spirit of the provision seems to be
that felonies and the law of nations refer to a broad body of law, external to
the Constitution, whose precise details, elements and penalties vary.
Congress could statutorily provide the requisite specificity to allow for
certain and uniform punishment. 86
The convention rejected Gouverneur Morris’s suggestion replacing the
“define” with “designate” because the former term “would be limited to its
preexisting meaning.” 87 Other members of the Convention argued that
“define” would allow the “creation of new offenses” in the case of felonies,
but not piracies. This implies that Congress cannot “designate” something
that the law of nations had not already made a piracy. Rather, Congress can
only specify the elements of an offense whose rough outlines emerged from
international custom. On the other hand, if the Framers were concerned that
the law of nations in its raw form was “too vague and deficient to provide a
rule” to govern individual behavior, it could be difficult for courts to
determine whether a given “definition” fits within the “vague” parameters.
This would be especially true under todays more fluid and expansive
international law. 88 Thus the scant evidence from the Framing does not
seem to resolve the issue.
Few decisions address the question directly. 89 However, the Court has
from the time of the early Republic acted as if it can review Congress’s

84

2 FARRAND, supra note , at 129 n.1
Id. at 614-15.
86
Madison, FEDERALIST PAPERS; United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. 153, 160-61 (1820)
(Story, J.):
Offences. . . against the law of nations, cannot. . . be said to be completely
ascertained and defined in any public code recognised by the common consent of
nations. In respect, therefore, as well to felonies on the high seas as to offences
against the law of nations, there is a peculiar fitness in giving the power to define
as well as to punish; and there is not the slightest reason to doubt that this
consideration had very great weight in producing the phraseology in question.
87
FARRAND at 316.
88
See HARV. L. REV. 118 at 2392.
89
Perhaps most recently, in Ex Parte Quirin, the Court considered whether the charged
offenses against the laws of war were in fact violations of the law of war. 317 U.S. 1, 18-19
(1942).
85
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“definition” against the external standard of the law of nations. 90 The Court
in Furlong, much like Marshall in his 1799 House speech, strongly insisted
that Congress cannot entirely arbitrarily classify something as a felony or
piracy (i.e., universally cognizable). This must depend on its status in
surrounding law:
Nor is it any objection to this opinion, that the law [the 1790 Crimes Act]
declares murder to be piracy. These are things so essentially different in their
nature, that not even the omnipotence of legislative power can confound or
identify them. . . . If by calling murder piracy, it might assert a jurisdiction
over that offence committed by a foreigner in a foreign vessel, what offence
might not be brought within their power by the same device? 91

Perhaps the most discussed case on the subject is United States v.
Arjona, in which the Court upheld a law against counterfeiting foreign
currency as an exercise of the Offenses power. 92 The Court briefly
considered whether the law legitimately falls within the “offenses”
category. It did not entirely take Congress’ word for it at all, but rather
looked to international law treatises. It found that the counterfeiting of
currency itself by individuals was not a violation of international law;
rather, international law imposed obligations on nations to prevent their
citizens from counterfeiting. 93 So the Court sustained the statute as
“necessary and proper” for the U.S.’s compliance with international law.
Some have suggested that Arjona’s “quick look” at international law,
and its sustaining of the statute despite finding a nexus rather than a tight fit
between it and international law, provides precedent for a very deferential
view of the Offenses power. However, Arjona is simply not that much of an
Offenses precedent at all. The Court saw the primary source of
congressional power as the Foreign Commerce clause aided by the
Necessary and Proper clause. 94 And the Court’s casual discussion of
international law constantly refers back to great effect such counterfeiting
can have on U.S. economic relations. 95
The purposes and precedent provide no support for the view that
Congress can “invent” offenses, or that courts cannot measure exercises of
90

See Smith, 18 U.S. at 160-61 (holding that statutory offense of “piracy as defined by
the law of nations” is in fact a violation of clear international law and thus punishable).
91
Furlong, at 198 (emphasis added).
92
129 U.S. 479 (1887).
93
Id. at 484-85 (“The national government is . . . made responsible to foreign nations
for all violations by the United States of their international obligations.”).
94
Id. at 483.
95
Id. at 486-67. Indeed, Congress did not cast the statute as an exercise of the Offenses
power; that argument apparently only arose in litigation. See id. at 488.

23-Mar-08]

Kontorovich

25

the Offenses clause against the law of nations as they understand it. 96 The
word “define” means an “express enumeration of all the particulars included
in that term,” according to Justice Story. 97 This suggests that Congress can
fill in interstitial questions, or resolve particular disputes and uncertainties
about the elements of an offense, but it cannot punish primary conduct that
is not an international crime.
Because the Clause refers to an external legal standard to limit
Congress, it suggests a particularly strong role for judicial review. 98 If the
law of nations cannot be used to establish judicially-reviewable limits on
Congress’s action, it could use the Offenses power to legislate regarding
anything. The obscure Clause 10 would overshadow all other regulatory
powers, even the Commerce Clause. It would be odd that such a vast grant
of authority over individuals, unchecked by any limiting principle, would
exist in the Constitution, or that it would have gone unnoted at the
convention and ratification debates. 99 Thus the most extensive examination
of the question has found that courts have consistently looked for
substantial state practice to establish the existence of a customary
international law (CIL) norm. 100
At the same time, limiting Congress to a preexisting definition would
nullify the power to “define,” a power which the Framers deliberately
conferred. Thus some slack between Congress’s “offenses” and “the law of
nations” must be tolerated. Yet the idea that Congress is owed substantial
deference in determining whether something violates international law
ultimately borders on a power to “invent.” This is especially true in an era
when many loose claims are made on the basis of international law, and few
96

See Siegal, supra n.83, at 877.
See United States v. Smith. Accord, 11 OP. ATT’N GEN. 297, 299 (1865) (“To define
is to give the limits or precise meaning of a word or thing in being; to make is to call into
being. Congress has power to define, not to make, the laws of nations . . ..”).
98
See Siegal, supra n.83, at 940-42.
99
See Teachout, supra n. 83, at 1321-22 (arguing that the “unambitious” purposes of
provision were to allow Congress to reach violations of international law for which the
U.S. would be held accountable, and to serve this goal, there would be no need for
Congress to criminalize conduct the rest of the world did not see as violating the law of
nations).
100
See Siegal, supra n. 83, at 895 (“([F]for the first 100 years after the Constitution, in
deciding the existence of customary international law, justices of the Supreme Court
looked to the actual practice of states.”). There is, however, substantial doubt about how
accurate such judicial investigations are, and the effort is likely to be even more difficult
today, given the proliferation of relevant languages, sources, and nations whose practice
counts towards the establishment of custom. See Michael Ramsey, International Law and
the Denominator Problem; Jack L. Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner, A Theory of
International Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1113 (1999) (arguing that Supreme Court mistakenly
took routine self-interested behavior for CIL norm in famous Paquette Habana case).
97

26

Art. I Horizon

[23-Mar-08

areas of human life lie outside the scope of some purported IL norm, and
advocates argue for a CIL that can emerge without overt state practice. If
the Courts do not police the “law of nations” requirement, Congress can by
citing some General Assembly resolutions and law review articles give
itself authority over anything. This would be inconsistent with the idea of
limited and enumerated powers, and would tend to frustrate the purposes of
judicial review. Thus while some slack must be allowed to exist between an
“objective” judicial view of the law of nations and Congress’s “definition,”
this says little about how much. Perhaps a useful distinguishing principle
would be elements of an offense versus the general form of the offense.
Obviously these can collapse into each other at a high enough level of
abstraction, but line-drawing problems are the life of the law.
B. Drug Smuggling Not Universally Cognizable
The two sources of international law are treaties and customary
(unwritten) international law. 101 The Constitution gives Congress different
powers to implement each type of international law. Mainstream
interpretations of the Treaty Power authorize Congress to implement
treaties through domestic legislation even when the law would not
otherwise fall within the enumerated powers. 102 When a treaty is in the
picture, the terms of the treaty itself govern the scope of Congress’s
jurisdictional power. 103 The “Offenses” power is implicated when there is
no treaty basis for the law, and so one must look to see whether Congress’s
offense roughly corresponds to customary international law. (Indeed, the
“law of nations” is the 18th century term for CIL.)
Drug trafficking is not recognized in customary international law as a
universally cognizable offense. Indeed, it is not a crime at international law
at all. 104 While there is no firm agreement on the precise set of crimes
101

See Charter of the International Court of Justice, Art. 38.
See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
103
See Part IV.A, infra. UJ laws were passed specifically to implement certain
multilateral conventions. However, these statutes arguably go further than the treaties they
are based on. The conventions only purport to confer jurisdictional over nationals of
signatory states. While most countries have joined these treaties, the implementing statutes
do not limit their application to nationals of signatory states.
104
See SEAN D. MURPHY, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 412-418 (2006)
(describing drug traffic as area of international criminal cooperation rather than
international crime); ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 436 (2d. ed. 2005)
(observing that illicit traffic in narcotic drugs not a crime in customary international law);
Many scholars suggest that the international crimes for which an individual may be held
criminally responsible are congruent with those which fall under universal jurisdiction;
certainly the major IL crimes are also universally cognizable, as the factors that contribute
to the former status are the same that lead to the latter. Id.
102
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subject to universal jurisdiction, there is a general consensus that they are
egregious, violent human rights abuses. Not a single universal jurisdiction
offense, or indeed widely recognized international crime, is a so-called
victimless offense. All U.S. courts to consider the issue have held that
narcotics traffic falls outside of universal jurisdiction. 105 Thus the most
respected lists of UJ offenses do not mention drugs at all. 106 Moreover,
commentators uniformly agree that there is absolutely no state practice
whatsoever for the universality of drug crimes (aside from the MLDEA, of
course). 107 No international convention criminalizes drug crimes, and no
international tribunal punishes them.
The most comprehensive statement on the law of the sea is the
comprehensive Third United Nations Convention on the Law of Sea
(UNCLOS III). The United States has not ratified the treaty, but the U.S.
(and almost all scholars) regard it as expressing the customary international
law on the subject. 108 UNCLOS expressly addresses drug smuggling and
piracy in neighboring provisions. 109 It makes clear the former is not an
105

See United States v. Perlaza, 439 F.3d 1149, 1162-63 (9th Cir. 2006) (rejecting UJ
as jurisdictional basis for MDLEA); United States v. Wright-Barker, 784 F.2d 161, 168 n.
5 (3rd Cir. 1986) (“[I]nternational agreements have yet to recognize drug smuggling as a
threat to a nation’s ‘security as a state or the operation of its governmental functions,’
warranting protective jurisdiction, RESTATEMENT, supra n.3, at § 33, or as a heinous crime
subject to universal jurisdiction.”); United States v. James-Robinson, 515 F. Supp. 1340,
1344 n. 6 (S.D. Fla. 1981) (“Drug trafficking is not recognized as being subject to universal
jurisdiction.”). But see, United States v. Marino-Garcia, 679 F.2d 1373, 1382 n. 16 (11th
Cir.1982) (finding “growing consensus” that drug trafficking should be UJ offenses and
suggesting that “it may well be that the time has arrived” that Congress “should” pass UJ
legislation to punish “all foreign vessels on the high seas that are engaged in drug
trafficking”). Marino-Garcia’s brief dictum is particularly odd in that it suggests Congress
can substantially punish anticipate IL developments, and act before an international
consensus has emerged. Even the Eleventh Circuit has avoided repeating this view.
106
See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Art. 5(1) (listing genocide,
war crimes, aggression, crimes against humanity as crimes within jurisdiction of the court);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 404;
PRINCETON PRINCIPLES OF UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION 29 (2001), available at
<http://lapa.princeton.edu/hosteddocs/unive_jur.pdf>.
107
See Adelheid Puttler, Extraterritorial Application of Criminal Law: Jurisdiction to
Prosecute Drug Traffic Conducted By Aliens Abroad, in EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION
IN THEORY AND PRACTICE, KARL M. MEESSEN ED.103 (1996) (“Similar to slave trade [in
the 19th century, when most nations condemned and banned it but refused to agree to UJ],
existing state practice does not support the conclusion that illicit drug traffic is subject to
universal jurisdiction as a matter of customary law.”).
108
Statement of President Ronald Reagan on United States Ocean Policy, 22 I.L.M.
461, 464 (1983) (“[T]he convention . . . contains provisions with respect to traditional uses
of the oceans which generally confirm existing maritime law and practice.”)
109
Compare United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature
December 10, 1982, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/122, 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982), Arts. 100, 101,
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international law crime like the latter is, and that drug smuggling is not
regarded as being sufficiently heinous to warrant universal jurisdiction.
Indeed, in the drafting of the convention, extending UJ to drug trafficking
vessels was proposed and rejected.
The common denominator of UJ offenses is their extraordinary
heinousness. An offense must be regarded as so inhumane, so shocking to
the conscience, that it makes all jurisdictional limitations moot. 110 Indeed,
the Second Circuit has recently held that terrorism has not attained the
status of a universal jurisdiction offense, and thus U.S. courts cannot put it
on the same jurisdictional footing as “Piracy.” 111
The Senate Report on the MDLEA described drug smuggling as
“universally recognized criminal behavior.” 112 Some courts have taken this
as a determination that it is an international crimes. But this finding does no
such thing. There is a vast difference between conduct that all nations
criminalize and international crimes. Uniform condemnation and
criminalization does not make something an international crime. 113 Murder
and rape, and indeed, most malum in se offenses, are also universally
condemned, none all fall outside of international law. 114 Presumably
Congress cannot legislate the punishment of purely foreign rapes despite it
being “universally recognized criminal behavior.” Indeed, the Senate report
makes no findings that would be relevant to the offense’s being universally
cognizable, such as the offense being extremely heinous, and beyond the
bounds of civilized society. Indeed, national drug laws and attitudes vary far
more than those for murder.
The status of drug trafficking as found in international custom does not
raise fine question of whether state practice has become general enough to
generate a binding norm, or whether the practice is accompanied by opinio
juris. There simply is no state practice, and a palpable lack of support in
relevant legal sources.

105 (piracy), with UNCLOS Art. 108. See Michael Tousely, United States Seizure of
Stateless Drug Smuggling Vessels on The High Seas: Is It Legal?, 22 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L
L. 375, 399-400 (1990). RESTATEMENT, supra n.3, § 513, comment e; § 521 Reporter's
notes; and, § 522 comment d.
110
United States v. James-Robinson, 515 F. Supp. 1340, 1344 n. 6 (S.D. Fla. 1981).
See also, Kontorovich, Piracy Analogy, supra n.3, at 204-05 & nn. 125-27.
111
112

See United States v. Yuosef, 327 U.S. 56, 108 (2d Cir. 2003).

See S .Rep. No. 99-530, at 16 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5986, 6001.
See M. Cherif Bassiouni, Universal Jurisdiction for International Crimes:
Historical Perspectives and Contemporary Practice, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 81 (2001)
(distinguishing “universality of condemnation” from “universal reach of national
jurisdiction”).
114
See Kontorovich, Piracy Analogy, supra n.3, at 206-07.
113
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C. Other International Law Bases for Jurisdiction
The understanding of the Define and Punish clause developed above
suggests one of two positions regarding the scope of UJ under the clause
today. The narrow view, one that would be supported by the text and some
evidence of the original meaning, would limit permanently limit UJ to
piracy, even if international law develop to include more offenses under
that category. The broader view would read the clause as authorizing
extraterritorial jurisdiction offenses over Felonies on the high seas and
Offenses against the law of nations to the extent that such jurisdiction is
allowed by contemporary international law. Both positions take the clause
as incorporating international law by reference. The difference is whether
such incorporation is static, locked into the 1789 content of international
law, or dynamic, expanding (or hypothetically, contracting) to track
international law.
The narrow view would obviously mean all UJ applications of the
MDLEA are unconstitutional. Drug trafficking does not in any way
resemble piracy (far from being robbery, it is sales) and thus it is a
“felony” and not universally cognizable. The broader view of the clause
obviously demands a more detailed inquiry into present-day international
law. The broad view treats “Piracies” as meaning “whatever set of offenses
the international law of the time treats as universally cognizable.” It has
been shown above the drug-trafficking is not such an offense.
Today’s jurisdictional norms are more copious than those of the early
Republic. Not only are there more UJ offenses, other flexible jurisdictional
categories have emerged that allow broad extraterritorial, if not universal,
jurisdiction. Thus in the dynamic view, if drug trafficking has become
something the U.S. could exercise jurisdiction over without a nexus under
international law, whether because of UJ or other international
jurisdictional rules unknown to the Framers, it can be treated as a “piracy”
for constitutional purposes. This subpart considers the two possible “nonUJ” justifications for MDLEA, the statelessness of the vessels, and the
protective principle of jurisdiction.
Two caveats: first, all of this is only relevant if one thinks “Piracy,” like
“Army and Navy” is supposed to track external legal changes. Second, the
discussion of international law here is not based on a view that it directly
binds Congress or the U.S. Rather, international law is only relevant
because Clause 10 explicitly refers to it by using terms of art borrowed
from the law of nations.
1. Statelessness
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Recall that the Marshall court, in a series of piracy cases hat rejected
UJ over foreign vessels in cases of murder and even classic piracy.
However, in other cases decided at the same time, the Court held that
Congress can punish even murder, a non-UJ “felony” when committed on
stateless vessels, even when there is no U.S. nexus. The vessels in these
cases were stateless by virtue of “turning pirate.” Thus these cases could be
understood as accommodating Congress’s desire to punish pirates,
something potentially endangered by the Court’s holding in Palmer. 115
The international law of the day did treat pirate ships as having lost their
national character or protection. 116
These decisions may stand for nothing more than a sort of
supplemental universal jurisdiction, allowing UJ over “felonies” when they
are part of the same “case or controversy” or “common nucleolus of
operative fact” as a “piracy.” At the same time, they could stand for a
broader proposition, that “felonies” can be punished aboard stateless
vessels, or even more broadly, that the Constitution allows UJ over
felonies to be as broad as allowable under international law. So if
international law allows UJ over stateless vessels as part of the law of the
“high seas,” Clause 10 incorporates this power.
Several different provisions in the MDLEA allow for UJ. One of them
allows for jurisdiction over stateless vessels, 117 and UJ over stateless
vessels is consistent with today’s CIL. 118 However, the MDLEA’s
definition of statelessness goes far beyond what is recognized by
international custom or convention. The statute defines a “vessel without
nationality” as one whose claim of registry is denied by their government,
or that does not claim a nationality, for example, by not flying a flag. 119
The MDLEA also includes vessels where the “nation of registry does not
affirmatively and unequivocally assert that the vessel is of its nationality.”
In other words, a properly registered, non-piratical vessel can be treated as
stateless if the flag state acquiesces, or simply does not reply. Under
international law, a vessel without nationality is one that is not registered
by any state, or whose registration involves some subterfuge, such as
flying multiple flags, or flags of state with which the vessel has no

115

See Kontorovich, Define and Punish, supra n.8.
Though piracy is still universally cognizable, it no longer results in statelessness.
See UNCLOS Art. 104 (“A ship or aircraft may retain its nationality although it has
become a pirate ship or aircraft.”).
117
§ 1903(c)(1)(1) (extending jurisdiction to “vessels without nationality”).
118
See Moreno-Morillo, 334 F.3d at 824-825.
119
Id. at (c)(2)(1) –(2). United States v. Tinoco, 304 F.3d 1088, 1116 (11th Cir.2002)
(describing vessel on which defendants were arrested as flying no flag and bearing no
registry or identifying markings).
116
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MDLEA’s final “statelessness” provision sweeps
include vessels that are properly authorized to fly a
goes beyond what international law recognizes as
it is not a statelessness rule. It is a rule of flag state

2. Protective Jurisdiction.
Several appeals courts have held that the MDLEA can be justified under
through the “protective principle” of international jurisdiction, 122 though
others have resisted this approach. 123 The protective principle is one of
limited and highly uncertain scope. The courts have given little reason for
treating the offenses as within protective jurisdiction apart from the fact that
the preamble to the MDLEA sounds vaguely (but only vaguely) like the test
for protective jurisdiction. But no treaty law or state practice supports such
broad jurisdiction over drug offenses, and indeed the cases make little effort
to show otherwise.
The principle allows a state to punish extraterritorially “a limited class
of offenses . . . directed against the security of the state or other offenses
threatening the integrity of governmental functions.” 124 Unlike more
traditional forms of jurisdiction, no actual harm to these interests need be
shown. Even more than UJ, the bounds of this jurisdictional theory are
unclear. 125 All commentators stress that the category of protective
jurisdiction offenses is quite small, and none suggest drug smuggling as one
of them.
Indeed, the cases that see the MDLEA as an exercise of protective
jurisdiction fundamentally misconceive the principle. It applies to conduct
120

See UNCLOS Arts. 91-92; 1958 Geneva Convention on High Seas Arts. 5-6.
See Moreno-Morillo, 334 F.3d at 825.
122
United States v. Gonzalez, 311 F.3d 440, 446 (11th Cir. 2203) (holding that
protective principle authorizes MDLEA, and the Congress invoked that principle in
statute’s preamble); United States v. Cardalles, 168 F.3d 548, 552 (1st. Cr. 1999)
(“Application of the MDLEA to the defendants is consistent with the protective principle
of international law because Congress has determined that all drug trafficking aboard
vessels threatens our nation's security.”); United States v. Peterson, 812 F.2d 486, 494 (9th
Cir. 1989) (“Drug trafficking presents the sort of threat to our nation's ability to function
that merits application of the protective principle of jurisdiction.”), reversed in relevant
part by, Perlaza, at 439 F.3d at 1162 (dismissing Peterson as “dicta” and finding protective
principle insufficient to establish jurisdiction over MDLEA defendants).
123
United States v. Robinson, 843 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir.1988) (Breyer, J.) (describing as
“forceful” the argument that protective principle only applies to conduct that threatens U.S.
specifically, and not the general drug trafficking of the MDLEA).
124
RESTATEMENT supra n.3, at § 402 cmt. f.
125
Id. at cmnt. D.
121
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that in itself could potentially endanger the security of the United States. As
the Restatement puts it, the conduct me be “directed against the security of
the [forum] state.” 126 Thus it would have to be shown that the particular
conduct endangered the U.S. This could obviously not be shown, because
by stipulation, there is no reason to believe the drugs were destined for, or
could reach or affect, U.S. markets. The MDLEA courts, however, think the
protective principle means jurisdiction over conduct of the general kind that
could endanger the U.S. If some drug trafficking endangers the U.S., the
courts seem to think all drug trafficking can be reached.
Moreover, “the security of the state” refers to the safety and integrity of
the state apparatus itself (its “government operations” or “state interests”),
not it’s overall physical and moral well-being. 127 This is demonstrated by
the Restatement’s examples: “espionage, counterfeiting of the state's seal or
currency, falsification of official documents, as well as perjury before
consular officials, and conspiracy to violate the immigration or customs
laws.” All these crimes are aimed at or particularly involve the government
apparatus of the forum state. Needless to say, the protective principle would
not authorize the U.S. to punish a Ghanan for violating Spanish immigration
laws or bribing Spanish officials.
There is no support for the principle reaching moral or victimless
crimes, and indeed, apparently only one other Western nation casts its
jurisdiction over drug crimes so broadly. 128 Indeed, treating drug crimes as
within protective jurisdiction would eliminate any difference between it and
universal jurisdiction. Indeed, it would sweep more broadly than even UJ by
allowing states to punish relatively minor crimes.
D. “High Seas” vs. Foreign Waters
The MDLEA, in some of its applications and provisions, may be an
ultra vires exercise of the Piracies and Felonies power for an entirely
different reason – it punishes drug crimes even beyond the “high seas.”
Moreover, the Court has repeatedly warned that jurisdiction over foreign
vessels in foreign waters would exceed Congress’s legislative competence.
1. The meaning of high seas.
Clause 10 does not give Congress a general power over extraterritorial
crimes. Rather, felonies can only be punished “on the High Seas.” 129 Unlike
126

Id.
Puttler, supra n.107, at 109.
128
Id. at 107.
129
U.N. Convention on the High Seas Art. 1 (1958) (“The term ‘high seas’ means all
parts of the sea that are not included in the territorial sea or in the internal.”).
127
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the difference between piracy and felony, this is an express textual
limitation on the Define and Punish power. Without such a limitation,
Congress would have a general police power. (The parallel provision,
“Offenses against the law of nations,” lacks such a limitation, but the class
of offenses is much narrower than felonies, and the former often involve
war, which can take place abroad).
The MDLEA, by its terms, applies to non-U.S. vessels neither on the
high seas nor in U.S. territorial waters – namely, to “vessel[s] located in the
territorial waters of another nation.” 130 The unconstitutionality of §
1903(c)(1)(E) is not a major impediment to the MDLEA’s policy, as very
few cases, if any, are brought under this part of the statue. But many
applications of the MDLEA’s other sections could potentially be void if
“high seas” in Clause 10 is read to mean what that term means in today’s
international law. Recall that because Clause 10 uses many international
law terms of art, it raises the question of whether their definition is locked
into the law of 1789, or “updates” to track changes in the law of nations.
Without updating, only piracy could be punished under UJ, and it would
take little analysis to show that drug trafficking is not piracy. However,
allowing updating could also cast doubt on much of the MDLEA.
In today’s customary international law, as articulated in the United
Nations Convention on the Law the Sea, the “high seas” begin up to 200
miles out from shore. 131 A great number of MDLEA cases – like the one in
the example at the beginning of this Article – involve based on conduct in
this 200 mile area that is neither the “territorial waters” of the foreign state,
but also not “the high seas.” This Article takes no position on the merits of
“updating,” which involves fundamental questions of interpretive
philosophy. However, it does seem that whether one decides to update or
not, the decision should be consistent at least within Clause 10: if UJ is not
locked into its 1789 parameters of just “piracy,” it is hard to see why the
“high seas” should not change with the times as well.
It would seem there is at least a strong policy case for “updating” here.
In 1789, territorial waters ended three miles from shore. In territorial
waters, Congress has plenary power over foreign vessels though the
admiralty clause. It would be odd to not allow Congress, under its admiralty
waters of a State
130
§ 1903(c)(1)(E). While such jurisdiction can only be exercised with the foreign
nation’s consent, this does not change the fact that U.S. drug law is made to apply beyond
the “high seas” limit of Clause 10. Clause 10 simply does not say “the high seas, or foreign
territory when the sovereign does not mind.”
131
Art. 86. Under the UNCLOS regime, waters are no longer territorial or “high.”
Rather, the new regime recognizes a broad intermediate area, the “exclusive economic
zone,” where the coastal state has many but not all sovereign rights. This area is explicitly
no longer treated as part of the high seas regime. See Arts. 55-57.
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powers, to expand its territorial admiralty power to keep up with the
maximum allowed by international law. No such proposition has ever been
suggested. Indeed, the MDLEA assumes total Congressional control over
territorial waters as defined by today’s international law.
2. Precedents and the admiralty power.
No case has ever decided the precise question of Congress’s power over
foreign vessels in foreign waters because prior to the MDLEA, largely
because the question rarely arises. Indeed, the leading case is eight years
old. There, the Court endorsed the view that the Define and Punish clause
did not reach into foreign waters. United States v. Flores concerned a
murder among the American crew of a U.S. vessel while in Belgian
waters. 132 The defendant argued that the plain text of the Define and Punish
Clause kept it from reaching conduct in foreign waters. The Court accepted
this point as self-evident. However, the Court though the prosecution could
be justified under another congressional power, over the admiralty or
maritime jurisdiction. 133 An examination of the Framers’ intent and drafting
history lead the Court to conclude that Constitution sought to give the
federal government all powers within the area of admiralty. The Define and
Punish power was thus a “supplement” rather than a “limitation” to broader
admiralty power. The admiralty power could extend in certain
circumstances even beyond the high seas, and Clause 10 should not be read
precluding this for felonies or piracies. 134
The Court’s examination of admiralty law lead it to conclude that it
allowed regulation “of vessels of the United States … while in foreign
territorial waters.” 135 The admiralty law follows the flag. Indeed, it seems
crucial to the Court’s opinion that the case involved a U.S. ship, as the
purpose of admiralty is to allow a nation to govern conduct on its vessels, a
matter in which it has a great interest regardless of where they are.136 Thus
Flores suggests Congress’s admiralty power could not encompass foreign
vessels in foreign waters.
This conclusion is strengthened by the only other discussion of the issue
132

289 U. S. 137 (1933).
133
The Court inferred from the grant of judicial authority over maritime and admiralty
cases, see Art. III, § 2, cl. 3, a correlate power of Congress to create the substantive body of
this law. Flores, 289 U.S. at 147-48.
134
Given the breadth of the admiralty power, it is hard to see how the Court’s reading
would make Clause 10 redundant rather than supplemental. Perhaps its significance lies in
allowing for common law punishment of high seas offenses, rather than confining such
cases to the civil regime of admiralty.
135
Id. at 149-50 (emphasis added).
136
Id., see also id. at 158 (noting that the case of a foreign vessel would be a “different
question”).
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by the Supreme Court. Oddly, though Flores attempted to engage the
original understanding of Constitution and the 1789 content of admiralty
jurisdiction, it makes no mention of this case, even though the opinion was
written by Justice Marshall, who had a much clearer view of the original
meanings and the nuances of admiralty law. United States v. Witelberger
involved a killing among an America crew of a vessel on a river 35 miles
inside China. 137 In the circuit court trial, the defendant’s counsel argued that
applying U.S. law there would exceed Congress’s power over “felonies on
the High Seas.” The U.S. Attorney conceded the Clause 10 issue. Instead,
he located congressional authority in the admiralty and maritime power,
anticipating Flores. 138 But he did not argue that admiralty extended beyond
the high seas into foreign waters. Rather, under standard, internationallyaccepted admiralty principles, it applied to a U.S.-flagged vessel wherever it
went. It would be “incredible” for such jurisdiction to not be authorized by
the Constitution. 139 Justice Washington, riding on circuit, thought the
question difficult enough to certify to the Supreme Court, which decided it
the following year.
A unanimous Court ruled against jurisdiction, but on the narrowest
grounds. Through an elaborate reading of the entirely of the Crimes Act of
1789, Marshall concluded that Congress’s punishment of manslaughter
“upon the high seas” was intended to have a more encompassed scope than
the maximum outer limits of the admiralty jurisdiction. 140 Thus Marshall
did not reach the constitutional question, which had occupied almost all the
argument below. The statutory construction is in his own admission
somewhat strained, and seems clearly designed to avoid a real constitutional
difficulty.
Naturally this did not stop him from offering an extended dictum on the
constitutional issue. In a lengthy footnote attached to the certificate in the
case, Marshall suggested the constitutional limits of admiralty extended
137

28 F. Cas. 727, No. 16,738 (C.C. Pa. 1819).
Id. All seemed to agree that the Constitution locks in some historic version of
admiralty jurisdiction, but given slight difference in the understanding of this jurisdiction in
different for a, it was unclear what was locked in. The U.S. Attorney argued that the
Constitution referred to the general principles of admiralty “as generally understood and
exercised amongst the nations of Europe; and not to the exercise of it at the period when
the constitution was framed.” Justice Marshall would go on to suggest that it referred to the
jurisdiction of the British Admiralty, but as the jurisdiction would be translated the
America – in other words, unburdened by certain statutes limiting jurisdiction over inland
waterways, which Marshall said were never intended to be applied to the Colonies.
139
Id. (“There is no civilized nation, with which we are acquainted, where jurisdiction
over offences committed on board of its own vessels, in foreign ports, would not be
exercised.”).
140
United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. 76, 95-98.
138
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beyond what would strictly be called the high seas. 141 But his discussion,
based on British admiralty practice, strongly implied that foreign vessels on
foreign waters would be excluded. Thus Marshall at most would be in
accord with the view of the U.S. Attorney, who saw the constitutionality of
U.S. jurisdiction as depending entirely on the vessel being American. 142
The Court has long held that the Define and Punish clause has no
application in foreign waters. Thus these areas, whatever their boundaries
are today, the MDLEA must depend on the admiralty power. But there is no
support in history, precedent or current practice for the view that foreign
vessels within foreign waters are within the jurisdiction of another state’s
admiralty. Indeed, two centuries of Supreme Court dicta indicate otherwise.
The scope of U.S. admiralty jurisdiction is generally defined by that of the
British Admiralty before the Revolution, and that did not go to foreign
vessels in foreign waters. Thus at least some applications of the MDLEA
exceed Congress’s powers regardless of what one thinks of the piracies vs.
felonies issues. But the fact the Congress, in exercising a power over the
“high seas” included foreign waters might itself suggest that the statute was
drafted without much thought about Art. I limitations.

IV. OTHER SOURCES OF ART. I POWER
While this Article argues that the MDLEA exceeds the Define and
Punish power, a statute is constitutional if there is any Art. I basis for it,
even if it is not the authority that Congress or the courts thought was being
exercised. This Part considers the most likely alternative sources for
Congress’s authority. 143 (The “admiralty and maritime” power was
considered and found wanting in Part III.C, as part of the “high seas”
discussion.) Here the Article considers at some length the treaty power, a
counterpart in some ways to the “Offenses” power. It also more briefly
141

Id. at 104, n. w. The principal difference is that the admiralty jurisdiction reached
inland rivers, bays and coastal areas beyond the open seas. The jurisdiction given by the
Constitution was that of the “admiralty jurisdiction of England, from which ours was
derived,” though this seems to have referred not to the actual jurisdiction of the Admiral in
1789, but to some previous, perhaps purer or teleological form. Id. Yet the note clearly
implies that this jurisdiction, like that of Britain, extended only to waters in U.S. territory.
142
As late as 1823, a district court found it “not clear” whether Congress’s legislative
authority extends to a murder on a U.S. vessel in Spanish waters. United States v. Gourlay,
25 F.Cas. 1382, 1397, No. 15,241 (C.C. N.Y. 1823).
143
See Bradley, Universal Jurisdiction, supra n.7 at 336 (suggesting that the foreign
commerce clause and treaty power would likely allow Congress to regulate “even if there
are some instances in which Article I of the Constitution would not [otherwise] supply
Congress with authority to enact a statute exercising universal jurisdiction”).
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discusses the relevance of the foreign commerce clause. The latter is easily
dismissed. There may be a colorable treaty clause argument, but it would
have to overcome considerable difficulties, especially since the relevant
treaty was ratified years after the MDLEA.
A. Treaty Power
Under the doctrine of Missouri v. Holland, Congress can act outside of
its otherwise enumerated powers when implementing a treaty. 144 However,
the extent to which a treaty can authorize action otherwise unconstitutional
remains unclear. 145 Certainly Congress cannot violate express guarantees of
individual rights. 146 Under current doctrine, treaties can trump implied
constitutional constraints such as federalism, but not express ones. (This
may be an odd result as the enumeration of powers in Art. I was supposed
to be the major Constitutional protection of individual rights.) The MDLEA
does not raise any questions of federalism or separation of powers, or
violate express individual rights. 147 Thus under Missouri it would be a valid
144

252 U.S. 416 (1920). Missouri was perhaps a weak case for establishing this
principle. It involved a migratory bird conservation treaty. Justice Holmes assumed for the
sake of argument, as lower courts had held, that the hunting of such birds could not be
reached through Congress’s enumerated powers. But he did not demonstrate this crucial
proposition, and it is not obvious even under the narrower Commerce doctrine of the time.
Moreover, if the Foreign Commerce power is broader than the interstate power, it could
have itself provided a Art. I basis for the statute.
Interestingly, Commerce Clause arguments played little role in the lower court
litigation. Instead, the lower courts relied on an earlier Supreme Court decision holding that
state animal export regulations do not violate the Dormant Commerce clause as meaning
that wildlife falls wholly outside the scope of the Commerce Clause. Of course the scope of
permissible state action under the dormant Commerce Clause is not coterminous with
permissible Congressional regulation under the Commerce Clause. Congress can properly
regulate many things which, in the absence of such legislation, states can affect through
their policies.
145
The debate goes back to the Founding era. For notable contributions to this debate,
see Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Executing the Treaty Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1867
(2005) (arguing that Missiouri v. Holland was wrongly decided); Gary Lawson and Guy
Seidman, The Jeffersonian Treaty Power, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 1 (arguing that treaty clause
simply authorizes additional method for carrying out powers already granted, and thus
could not support treaties that go beyond existing federal powers); Curtis Bradley, The
Treaty Power and American Federalism, 97 MICH. L. REV. 390 (arguing that treaty power
should not be construed so as to negate federalism). But see, David Sloss, International
Agreements and the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1963 (2003);
David Golove, Treaty-Making and the Nation: The Historical Foundations of the
Nationalist Conception Of The Treaty Power, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1075 (2000);
146
See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988) ; Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
147
Some have challenged the statute’s UJ provisions on due process grounds, see Part
I.C.1, supra. Those challenges, which courts have almost entirely rejected, fall outside the
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exercise of Congress’s authority if “necessary and proper” to some
treaty. 148 The question then is whether there is such a treaty. Certainly the
legislative history of the act does not mention any treaty basis. Similarly,
courts have never mentioned the treaty as a source for Congress’s Art. I
authority, thought they have mentioned it to show that the MDLEA
complies with international law 149 and fairness. 150 The courts and Congress
were right to not invoke the treaty power. For while there arguably is a U.S.
treaty implicated by the MDLEA – the United Nations Convention Against
Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances 151 – a close
examination of its provisions and the circumstances of its enactment shows
it cannot easily be taken as a basis for the MDLEA.
The provisions of the Convention that specifically contemplate
MDLEA-type situations do not purport to confer additional jurisdictional
powers. The Convention’s jurisdictional provision first requires parties to
take jurisdiction of offenses committed within their respective territorial or
flag jurisdiction. 152 It goes on to encourage, but not require, states to enter
into agreements with each other authorizing interdiction of drug trafficking
by each other’s vessels – exactly the kind of arrangements under which
most MDLEA cases arise. 153
1. Bilateral Maritime Agreements.
Under these bilateral agreements, if both the interdicting and the flagstate agree, the former may also exercise adjudicative jurisdiction over the
latter’s nationals arrested in the course of the interdiction efforts. 154 The
Convention does not require any state to exercise such extraterritorial
jurisdiction. Nor does it authorize it – ultimately, it is the home state’s
consent that makes prosecution possible, and the home state’s consent
would have had exactly the same legal effect in the absence of the UN
Convention. The Convention merely speaks of the possibility of such
arrangements. 155 Thus this provision of the Convention creates no new
rights or obligations, so it is hard to see how it could be a source of
additional legislative power for Congress.
scope of this argument. For purposes of argument, the Article here assumes the MDLEA
does not violate the Fifth Amendment, and thus could fairly be an exercise of treaty power.
148
Bradley, Universal Jurisdiction, supra n.7, at 323.
149
United States v. Bravo, 489 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2007).
150
Suerte at 377.
151
(1988); ratified by U.S. in 1990. The Convention has 183 state parties.
152
Art. 4(1)(a).
153
See id., Art. 17(4)(c).
154
See id., Art. 4(1)(b)(ii).
155
See MURPHY, supra, at 412-13 (describing convention as setting up framework for
international cooperation but not as criminalizing any conduct).
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Nor do the Maritime Agreements themselves – the bilateral
arrangements contemplated by the Convention, and in whose shadow the
MDLEA prosecutions occur – provide a “Treaty Power” basis for the
statute. First, most of them are not treaties but rather mere executive
agreements, entered into by State Department officials with no
congressional input, let alone advice and consent. 156 Even broad defenders
of the “nationalist” view of Missouri think that unlike treaties, sole
executive agreements cannot go be the basis for legislation beyond what
Art. I would otherwise authorize – that is, executive agreements don’t do
what treaties do under Missouri. Moreover, the Agreements do not confer
any authority on the U.S. with respect to prosecution. Rather, they simply
set up rules for cooperation in drug interdiction but they do not authorize,
let alone require, the U.S. to prosecute. 157
The standard jurisdictional provision states that the flag state, while
retaining “primary” jurisdiction, “may . . . waive its primary right to
exercise jurisdiction and authorize the enforcement of United States law
against the vessel and/or persons on board.” Some agreements go further
and expressly disclaim giving any jurisdiction to the U.S. 158 Simply put,
these agreements do not give the U.S. any jurisdiction it did not previously
have. (Indeed, the purpose of the agreements is to facilitate enforcement,
not prosecution.)
This waiver is done on a case by case basis, usually initiated by a State
Department or Coast Guard request. Often the consent is provided by lowlevel functionaries. It may be provided orally, and in some cases, the
source, form and content of the consent remains obscure. 159 Such
authorization certainly falls short of a formal treaty, or even of an executive
agreement. Certainly such consent, especially when made in the framework
of a bilateral agreement and in the shadow of the UN Convention, removes
any potential international law problems with U.S. jurisdiction. But that
does not answer the Art. I question. The notion that a mere waiver by
another nation of its rights at international law can expand the legislative
competence of Congress goes much further than even the broadest view of
Missouri v. Holland. 160
156

But see Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and
the Government of the Republic of Colombia to Suppress Illicit Traffic by Sea, Feb. 20,
1997, T.I.A.S. No. 12835.
157
The State Department uses a six-part “Model Maritime Agreement,” which covers
enforcement issues like shipriders, pursuit, overflights, and boarding. Most of the 26
nations with which the U.S. has such deals have agreed to less than all six parts.
158
See note 33, supra.
159
See, e.g., United States. v. Normandin, 378 F.Supp.2d 4, 8 (D. P.R. 2005).
160
Even if the maritime agreements were to provide a treaty clause hook for the
MDLEA, they would still leave open the question of those people convicted in the past two
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Indeed, the bilateral agreements highlight a danger of Holland’s rule
that Congress can expand its legislative powers through treaty. Generally
the consent of the foreign state is understood as some kind of check on
abuses of the treaty power. Foreign states will presumably not enter deals
just to allow Congress to aggrandize itself. But the U.S. has extraordinary
bargaining power with respect to most of the nations it has signed bilateral
maritime agreements with, such as St. Kitts and Nevis, or Dominica.
Many nations were reluctant to enter agreements which they saw as
impinging on their sovereign territory or law enforcement functions. 161
Washington, however, threatened these states with substantial aid
reductions and other economic sanctions if they did not enter the
agreements. 162 Such ultimatums caused quite a bit of bad feeling in
countries like Jamaica, but have proved ultimately effective. 163 Yet it would
have potentially troubling implications if such purchased treaties could give
Congress power to do what Art. I had not allowed it. 164
2.

Extradite or Punish provisions.
The strongest Treaty Clause basis for the MDLEA is a provision of the
Convention contained in the subsequent section of the jurisdictional article,
that permits but does not require states to punish or extradite offenders
“present in its territory” but otherwise unconnected to the forum. 165 Once
MDLEA defendants are seized on the high seas by the Coast Guard for the
purposes of prosecution, they are “present in its territory.” While it is not
clear the Convention contemplated coerced presence, such factors clearly
make no difference in U.S. law. 166 Still, for purposes of the Treaty Power, it
matters what the treaty allows. Certainly similar “extradite or punish”
provisions in other treaties have been held to allow jurisdiction based on
coerced presence. However, several factors suggest a different answer here.
decades who were seized on vessels of states with whom the U.S. did not have an
agreement.
161
See Statement of Adm. Riutta, supra n.31; Lloyd Williams, The Shiprider
Agreement: No smooth sailing, Jamaica Gleaner (Feb. 8, 2004), available at
<http://www.jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20040208/cleisure/cleisure2.html>.
162
See id. (“The dominant view throughout Latin America, the Caribbean and, of
course, Jamaica, . . . was that Uncle Sam was being his big, bad bullying self, threatening
that these nations sign a standard agreement, or be de-certified [from a list of nations that
fight drugs, and thus loose U.S. funding].”).
163
Joseph E. Kramek, Bilateral Maritime Counter-Drug And Immigrant Interdiction
Agreements: Is This The World Of The Future?, 31 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 121, 146
(2000) (“Some countries feel compelled into signing bilateral maritime agreements with
the United States.”).
164
Cf. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
165
Art. 4(2)(b).
166
Yunis; Ker-Frisbee doctrine
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The Convention contains particular jurisdictional and substantive
clauses dealing with joint drug interdiction on the high seas – the provisions
that prompted the creation of the Bilateral Maritime Treaties. Thus one
might be hesitant to construe an entirely separate jurisdictional provision,
4(2)(b), as covering cases where the defendant “is present” in the forum
state because of the operation of arrangements specifically addressed by
those clauses. One can read 4(1)(b)(2) as being exclusive of (2)(b). In other
words, the provisions that discuss jurisdiction over vessels solely govern
maritime drug smuggling; thus the broader provision would not be
available.
This conclusion is strengthened when one reads the Convention
alongside UNCLOS, to which the narcotics convention explicitly refers. 167
As discussed above, UNCLOS only authorizes UJ over piracy and slave
trading; for maritime drug trafficking it merely calls for “cooperation.” 168
Because UNCLOS provides a comprehensive set of regulations for
maritime matters, the drug convention should not be easily read as
expanding UJ over conduct committed on the high seas beyond what
UNCLOS allows. Indeed, those provisions of the narcotics convention that
deal with maritime vessels simply elaborate the content of “cooperation.”
Thus the broader “extradite or punish” provisions should not be read as
conferring a separate authority over persons apprehended on the high seas.
To put it differently, since UNCLOS reflects a deliberate judgment to
not allow UJ in such cases, interpreting the Illicit Substances Convention as
authorizing UJ would mean to two treaties conflict. This would be awkward
for the close to 200 nations that are parties to both treaties. It would also
have ungainly consequences for the MDLEA. While the U.S. is not
currently a party to UNCLOS, despite having signed it, Congress could
presumably act under the (arguably) broader jurisdictional provisions of the
Illicit Traffic Convention. Yet if the Senate ratifies UNCLOS, as most
observers expect it to do very shortly, the last-in-time rule with respect to
treaties would mean that UNCLOS cuts off Congress’s treaty power to
authorize the MDLEA. Given the number of nations party to both treaties, it
seems safest to construe there provisions so as to not conflict.
3. Novel Problems with the Convention as a Constitutional basis.
Two additional factors, one quite unusual, cast doubt on the Illicit
Trafficking Convention as a Treaty Power basis for the MDLEA. Firstly,
the treaty was drafted and ratified several years after the statute was
enacted. 169 Thus it is no surprise Congress did not see the law as an exercise
167

See Art. 17(1).
See UNCLOS, Art. 108(1).
169
The U.S. ratified the Convention in 1990. The MDLEA was adopted in 1986, but
168
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of the treaty power. Thus at the very least, the Convention does nothing for
constitutionality of the statute’s UJ provisions ab initio. It is a nice question
whether an unconstitutional statutory provision can be saved by a
subsequent treaty. 170 Congress’s authority for legislation pursuant to treaties
is a combination of the Treaty and Necessary and Proper Clause. Even
though the latter has been given almost limitless scope, it would seem
fundamentally odd to say that a statute was “necessary” to implement a
treaty not yet in existence.
Even when the treaty is subsequently ratified, it is hard to see how an
existing statute could retroactively become “necessary and proper” to it:
Congress did not pass the law to implement the treaty. If the law is
“necessary” to the treaty, that must be determined by a new Congress, one
contemporaneous with the treaty. Furthermore, it would seem an invitation
to mischief if Congress could pass a statute that, while unconstitutional at it
inception, could be automatically resuscitated by subsequent developments,
like a treaty, constitutional amendment, judicial reinterpretation. In any
case, if the MDLEA exceeds Art. I powers, the subsequent ratification of
the treaty could certainly not save convictions and sentences secured up
until then.
A second problem with using the Convention to justify the MDLEA lies
in limitations imposed by the Senate when it ratified the treaty. The U.S.
entered a declaration that “nothing in this Treaty requires or authorizes
legislation or other action by the United States of America prohibited by the
Constitution of the United States.” Such declarations are generally entered
to limit the constraining effect of a treaty, to avoid international obligations.
In this case, it could be read as preventing a potentially empowering effect
of the treaty. If the Constitution can be said to “prohibit” universal
jurisdiction over non-universal crimes, then the Convention cannot confer
such a power. A question remains whether “prohibited” is meant simply to
track the Missouri v. Holland sense of “expressly ruled out,” or in the more
common sense of not authorized by constitutional law. One might favor the
latter reading because Senate has since the 1950s attached such declarations
to treaties specifically because of their discomfort with the broad rule of
Missouri. With the Illicit Substances Convention, the primary concern
behind the declaration seems to have been the extradition of U.S. citizens to

some of its UJ aspects were already present in the Marijuana on the High Seas Act of 1980,
on which it built.
170
It is apparently a question of first impression, even in the academic literature. The
question is not answered by Missouri v. Holland, where Congress passed a second statute
“pursuant” to the treaty after an earlier one had run afoul in the lower courts: in that case,
the treaty still preceded the statute.
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countries that would not afford them due process. 171 This does not mean the
Senators would not have thought the declaration applicable to otherwise
unconstitutional expansions of Congress’s criminal powers. Most likely, the
potential UJ issues raised by the Convention escaped their notice. 172
B. Foreign Commerce Clause
One might think the Foreign Commerce Clause could support the
MDLEA. 173 After all, the interstate commerce clause, assisted by the
necessary and proper power, allows Congress to regulate much that is not
itself interstate commerce. And perhaps the scope of the foreign commerce
clause is even broader: since the regulation of foreign commerce is an
exclusively federal power, it does not run up against federalism principles
or reserved rights of states.
However, the MDLEA lies even beyond the foreign commerce power.
However broad it is, the foreign commerce power does not authorizing
legislation regarding conduct with no demonstrable and direct nexus with
the United States. Exactly how much of a connection the conduct must have
is a difficult question, but one that need not be answered in a UJ case. With
the MDLEA UJ cases, there is no evidence of any connection to the U.S.
Not surprisingly, there is little precedent or commentary on this issue.174
When Congress legislates extraterritorially, as it does with increasing
frequency, it is almost always because of the foreign conduct’s effect on
U.S. commerce, not despite it. However, what authority there is clearly
recognizes a limit to the foreign commerce power, one that UJ legislation
would exceed. One of the earliest and most significant discussions of UJ,
flatly rejected using the foreign commerce power as a substitute for the
Define and Punish power:
Rather than relying on Congress's direct authority under Art. I Section 8
to define and punish offenses against the law of nations, the government
171

See Statement of Sen. Helms, 135 Cong. Rec. S16615-01, S16617, 1989 WL
189698.
172
The Attorney General’s description of the jurisdictional provisions to the Senate did
not mention UJ at all, and indeed, his discussion of its extraterritorial affect implied it
would not allow UJ. See Statement of Dick Thornborough, id. at S16619 (“Parties may
establish jurisdiction over offenses committed by their nationals, committed on board
vessels outside their territorial waters which are properly boarded and searched, and with
respect to conspiratorial offenses committed outside their territory with a view to
commission of a covered offense within their territory.”).
173
Cf. Bradley, Universal Jurisdiction, supra n.7, at 336 (“[A]t least some invocations
of the universal jurisdiction concept by Congress are likely to involve situations in which
there are effects on foreign commerce--for example, the disruption of shipping lanes or air
traffic due to piracy.”).
174
See id.
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contends that Congress has authority to regulate global air commerce under
the commerce clause. . . . Congress . . . is not empowered to regulate foreign
commerce which has no connection to the United States. Unlike the states,
foreign nations have never submitted to the sovereignty of the United States
government nor ceded their regulatory powers to the United States. 175

Thus courts in MLDEA case have entirely disclaimed the commerce clause
as a basis for the law. 176
The question of UJ and the Foreign Commerce clause was recently
discussed at some length by Prof. Colangelo. He concludes:
The text of the Foreign Commerce Clause along with what we know
about the founders’ beliefs regarding state sovereignty and attendant rules of
jurisdictional non-interference lead persuasively to the conclusion that for
Congress to act extraterritorially under the Clause, the conduct it seeks to
regulate must exhibit a direct connection to U.S. commerce. 177

This is not the place to recapitulate Prof. Colangelo’s able exposition of
the arguments. Briefly, the text of the clause suggests that the commerce
must be “with” the U.S. The Constitution does not use the term “among”
that it uses for “commerce among the states.” 178 This shows that it is not
enough for the commerce to be between some foreign states. Rather, the
U.S. must be on one side of the transaction. Moreover, the Framers’
territorial concepts of jurisdiction make it highly improbable that they
intended to give Congress plenary power to legislate over all global
economic activity. 179 Nothing in the purposes of the Commerce Clause
suggest such a power. Consider the kinds of laws Congress can pass under
its interstate commerce powers. Surely it would be odd to think the
Constitution empowers Congress to legislate safety conditions for Yemeni
shoe repairmen, or regulate backyard wheat production or prostitution in
Pakistan.
To continue the reductio ad absurdum, if one thought the Foreign
Commerce power to be as robust as the domestic one, it would imply the
175

Yunis, 681 F .Supp. at 907 n.24. See also, United States v. Georgescu, 723 F. Supp.
912, 918 (E.D. N.Y. 1989) (observing that Foreign Commerce clause gives Congress
power “to criminalize activities affecting our foreign commerce”).
176
See Moreno-Morillo, 334 F.3d at 825.
177
Anthony J. Colangelo, Constitutional Limits on Extraterritorial Jurisdiction:
Terrorism and the Intersection of National and International Law, 48 HARV. INT’L L.J.
121, 147 (2007).
178
Id. at 148-49.
179
Id. at 149-51. Furthermore, to the extent the protections of the Bill of Rights, such
as the Takings Clause, do not apply to foreigners abroad, Congress’s power to legislate for
foreign countries could exceed its power to legislate domestically, a counterintuitive result.
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existence of a Dormant Foreign Commerce clause – a power of federal
courts or Congress to strike down foreign laws that burden international
commerce. Such a power has never been suggested, because of the
fundamentally different nature of domestic intrastate commerce from purely
foreign commerce. This shows that one cannot simply export doctrine from
the interstate commerce clause to the foreign one.
CONCLUSION
Congress has almost never used its Define and Punish power to punish
conduct with no connection to the U.S. The first time it did so, in 1790, the
Supreme Court narrowly interpreted the law to avoid constitutional
difficulties. Soon after, Congress steered a statute clear of a much-desired
UJ provision because of similar doubts. One hundred sixty years later,
Congress ventured back into the poorly chartered-waters of UJ with the
MDLEA – and ran afoul of shoals.
In general, the Constitution does not empower Congress cannot legislate
for foreigners in international waters or abroad. If Congress could do so, its
powers would be unlimited. There is an exception to this for piracy,
stateless vessels, and perhaps other areas where international law allows UJ.
But Congress cannot by fiat make something a UJ offense when CIL does
not treat it as such. To paraphrase Furlong, if by calling drugs smuggling
piracy, Congress could assert jurisdiction over an offense committed by a
foreigner in a foreign vessel, what offence might nor be brought within their
power by the same device? Surely Congress could not regulate dueling on
foreign vessels, as Justice Marshall put it.
Most applications of the MDLEA that do not involve a U.S. nexus
exceed Congress’s Define and Punish power. That only authorizes Congress
to regulate conduct that either has some direct relation to the U.S., or is
universally cognizable in international law. (In an narrower and quite
plausible view of the clause, piracy is the only offense to which UJ can
attach). Drug trafficking is not a UJ offense; nor does it fall under the
similarly far-reaching protective principle of jurisdiction. Moreover, the
MDLEA extends to vessels in foreign countries exclusive economic zones,
and even in their territorial waters. This violates the clause’s explicit
limitation to crimes on the “high seas.”
There is a difficult argument to be made for the MDLEA as legislation
pursuant to a treaty, if one takes a sufficiently broad view of what
“necessary and proper” to a treat is. However, the use of the treaty power to
sustain the statute would depend on several other difficult and untested
propositions, such as Congress being able go beyond its Art. I powers in
pursuance of non-mandatory (i.e., aspirational or permissive) treaties, and
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of treaties not yet on the books when the law is enacted.
However, there may be sections of the MDLEA that have some basis in
the traditional understanding of the Felonies power. In particular, the
MDLEA’s application to stateless vessels (as defined in international law)
may be consistent with the Felonies power as it has been applied in the only
Supreme Court decisions dealing with such issues.

